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AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE JURY’S ROLE IN A NEW YORK
CRIMINAL TRIAL
Matthew Tulchin∗
INTRODUCTION
On February 19, 2003, the New York State legislature received
a proposed amendment to the state constitution advocating the
elimination of the unanimity requirement for juries in criminal
cases.1 The sponsors of the amendment believe eliminating the
unanimity requirement “will produce more convictions and put
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1
Assemb. 4469, 226th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003). New York’s right to a jury
trial is protected in Article I, § 2 of the New York Constitution. Section 2 states
in pertinent parts: “Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been
guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever . . . . The
legislature may provide, however, by law, that a verdict may be rendered by not
less than five-sixths of the jury in any civil case.” N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2. The
resolution presented to the General Assembly proposes changing Section 2 to
read: “The legislature may provide, however, by law, that a verdict may be
rendered by not less than five-sixths of the jury in any civil case or
misdemeanor, and not less than three-fourths of the jury in any felony case.”
Assemb. 4469, 226th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003) (emphasis added). As of
September 2004, the bill had been sent to the Attorney General for comments
and was under review by the Judiciary Committee. See NEW YORK STATE
ASSEMBLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF Assemb. 4469, 226th Leg. Sess.
(2003).
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more criminals behind bars.”2 This is not the first time such a
change has been proposed in New York.3 Currently, New York and
several other states do not require unanimous verdicts in civil
cases.4 Fortunately, most states have not taken this approach in
criminal trials.5 If accepted by New York’s General Assembly, this
move would be an alarming and dangerous step in the anti-jury
movement sweeping the country.6
2

NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF Assemb.
4469, 226th Leg. Sess. (2003) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM].
3
Id. A similar amendment was rejected in 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and
2001. Id. See also People v. Sanabria, 249 N.Y.S.2d 66, 69-70 (N.Y. App. Div.
1964) (reviewing the 1931 New York legislature’s debate over proposals to
require less than unanimous verdict in jury trials).
4
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (2003); see also UTAH CONST. art. I, § 10 (2003)
(three-fourths of jurors); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6 (2003) (five-sixths of the jury);
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7 (2003) (three-fourths); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 23 (2004)
(“number required to render a verdict, shall be specified by law”); MONT.
CONST. art. II, § 26 (2002) (two-thirds of the jury). In all, 34 states allow nonunanimous jury verdicts in civil trials. PAULA L. HANNAFORD ET AL., NAT’L
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM? (2002), available
at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_Juries_HungJuriesPub.pdf
(citing STATE COURT ORGANIZATION, 1998, Table 42 (Trial Juries: Size and
Verdict Rules)).
5
Only Oregon and Louisiana allow for majority verdicts in felony cases.
HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 4, at 1 (citing LA. CODE CRIM PROC. Art. 782
(2004) (stating that in “[c]ases in which punishment is necessarily confinement
at hard labor shall be tried by a jury composed of twelve jurors, ten of whom
must concur to render a verdict”) and OR. REV. STAT. § 136.450 (2003)
(providing “the verdict of a trial jury in a criminal action shall be by concurrence
of at least 10 of 12 jurors [and] [e]xcept when the state requests a unanimous
verdict, a verdict of guilty for murder or aggravated murder shall be by
concurrence of at least 11 of 12 jurors.”). Oklahoma eliminated the unanimity
requirement in misdemeanor trials. Id.
6
See, e.g., Charles W. Joiner, From the Bench, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN
AMERICA 149-50 (Rita James Simon, ed., Sage Publications 1975) (suggesting
that a verdict of ten out of twelve jurors would be sufficient); Robert Boatright
& Elissa Krauss, A Report on the First National Meeting of the Ever-Growing
Community Concerned With Improving the Jury System, 86 JUDICATURE 145
(Nov.-Dec. 2002); Tom M. Dees, III, Juries: On the Verge of Extinction? A
Discussion of Jury Reform, 45 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1789-1804 (2001); Paula L.
Hannaford & G. Thomas Munsterman, Reshaping The Bedrock of Democracy:
American Jury Reform During the Last 30 Years, 36 NO. 4 JUDGES’ J. 5 (1997);
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In recent years, some state legislatures have discussed
measures that would curtail the jury’s power,7 while other states,
Jere W. Morehead, A “Modest” Proposal for Jury Reform: The Elimination of
Required Unanimous Jury Verdicts, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 933, 933-34 (1998)
(“[A]pparent failures of the citizen jury in recent years . . . has called into
question the function of this important constitutional guarantee . . . .”).
7
See Sandra D. Jordan, The Criminal Trial Jury: Erosion of Jury Power, 5
HOW. SCROLL 1, 1-2 (2002). Tom Dees includes in his appendix jury reform
recommendations from Arizona, California, Colorado, District of Columbia,
New York, and Texas. California’s jury reform included suggestions to amend
the state constitution to allow juries of eight or less for misdemeanor cases and
to allow nonunanimous verdicts in felony cases where the jury has deliberated
more than six hours. Dees, supra note 6, at 1795. See also J. Clark Kelso, Final
Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Jury System Improvement, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 1433, 1442-45, 1488-1501 (1996); Jeremy Osher, Note &
Comment, Jury Unanimity in California: Should It Stay or Should It Go?, 29
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1319, 1323-25, 1336-38 (1996) (discussing California’s
attempt to eliminate the unanimity requirement). See generally The National
Center for State Courts website, available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/
Publications/KIS_JurInnStatesPub.pdf. It is interesting to note that in 1990 New
York also considered a proposal to eliminate the constitutional protection of
grand juries. NEW YORK STATE SENATE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SENATE
STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY (1990). Proponents of this measure argued
that the grand jury was an outdated and antiquated institution, which no longer
served a valuable purpose in society. MICHAEL COLODNER & MATTHEW T.
CROSSON, DRAFT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE CONCURRENT
RESOLUTION OF THE SENATE AND ASSEMBLY PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO
ARTICLE I AND VI OF THE CONSTITUTION 1-2 (on file with author). In addition,
they claimed that since the federal constitution did not protect the grand jury,
New York should not protect it in its state constitution. Id. Testifying at the Joint
Legislative Hearing of the Senate Committee on Codes and the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, Professor Susan N. Herman argued against this
proposal and based her argument on an historical analysis of the grand jury in
New York. Proposals to Amend Provisions of the New York State Constitution
and the New York Criminal Procedure Law Concerning Right to Indictment by
Grand Jury Before the Senate Committee on Codes and the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 1990 Leg. (NY 1990) (statement of Professor Susan N.
Herman, Brooklyn Law School) (on file with author). After months of hearings
on the subject, the legislature decided against enacting the proposal and instead
chose to focus on ways to make the grand jury process more efficient. ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, supra at 4-5.
Although these debates focused on the grand jury and occurred over ten years
ago, the same issues arise in today’s debate regarding jury reform. Considering

TULCHIN MACROED FINAL 2-28-05.DOC

428

3/14/2005 2:45 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

including New York, have initiated jury reform programs aimed at
improving the operation of the existing jury system.8 Fueling these
initiatives are publicized jury nullification actions such as the O.J.
Simpson case,9 instances of hung juries, such as the Dennis
Kozlowski-Tyco trial,10 and the general perceptions of legislators,
judicial officers, and prospective jurors that the jury system is
ineffective in its present form.11 Critics of the jury system question
whether juries presently provide a vital service to our judicial
that the grand jury and the petit jury share similar characteristics and historical
origins, Professor Herman’s argument and her emphasis on the historical aspects
of the right are informative and particularly relevant to the debate on jury
reform.
8
Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals appointed
a commission in the Spring of 2002 to conduct a thorough review of the jury
system and come up with ways to improve its operation. Press Release, New
York State Court System, Court System Launches Second Phase of the Jury
Reform in New York (June 17, 2004) (on file with author), available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/press. The commission released an interim report in
June 2004 and it is available at http://www.jury commission.com/pr2004_11.pdf
(last visited Feb. 21, 2005). See also Judith S. Kaye & Albert M. Rosenblatt,
Introduction to Special Edition on Juries, 73 N.Y. ST. B.J. 8 (June 2001);
Anthony Ramirez, Courts Plan to Waste Less of Jurors’ Time, N.Y. TIMES, June
18, 2004 at B3; Susan Saulny, Jury Duty? Prepare for Rejection, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 2003, at B1, B5. For a discussion of other states’ reform movements, see
supra note 7. See also Arizona Governor Signs ‘Jury Patriotism Act’; ALEC
Model Bill Becomes Law, U.S. NEWSWIRE, May 14, 2003, available at 2003 WL
3731352; Robbi Hess, Rochester Attorney Appointed to NY State Commission
on the Jury, DAILY RECORD (Rochester, NY), July 30, 2003, available at 2003
WL 16077082; Jane Spencer, Courts Try to Make Jury Duty More Palatable,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2004, at D1.
9
See, e.g., Barbara Allen Babcock, Opinion, Protect the Jury System,
Judge Was the Problem, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, at M6 (defending the O.J.
Simpson jury).
10
See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Tyco Mistrial: The Overview; Tyco
Trial Ends as Juror Cites Outside Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2004, at A1
(discussing the result of the Tyco trial); Andrew Ross Sorkin & Jonathan D.
Glater, Criminal Intent Seems the Focus of Juror’s Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
2004 at C1, C6 (discussing the controversy surrounding the lone dissenting juror
in the Tyco case)
11
See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 8, at D1 (discussing “recent controversies
involving jurors in the Tyco, Martha Stewart and World Trade Center cases”
and initiatives states are taking to solve these problems).
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system and whether they even have the ability to provide this
service.12 These critics also debate whether the common law right
to a jury should continue to receive constitutional protection at the
state level.13
Many critics assert that the best way to address problems such
as jury nullification and instances of hung juries would be to
eliminate the unanimity requirement.14 Unfortunately, as evidenced
by the proposed constitutional amendment, many New Yorkers

12

See Jordan, supra note 7, at 1-2 (stating that “[t]he American jury is in
serious trouble” and that “segments of society believe that twelve ordinary
citizens are not equipped to make important decisions”); Graham C. Lilly, The
Decline of the American Jury, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 53, 53-54 (2001) (discussing
some of the problems faced by juries in adapting to modern litigation); Douglas
G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25
HOFSTRA L. REV. 377 (1997). See also THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA (Rita
James Simon ed., Sage Publications 1975); RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE
AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM (2003); WILLIAM L. DWYER, IN THE HANDS OF THE
PEOPLE (2002); Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of
Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 927 (1994)
(providing a brief history of the criminal jury in the United States and
concluding that “[o]nly a shadow of this communitarian institution has
survived”); Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169 (1995) (presenting several ideas for improving the jury
system).
13
See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 359 (1972) (holding that a
conviction based on a 9-3 jury verdict did not violate defendant’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)
(upholding a conviction based on an 11-1 jury verdict as it did not violate the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial); Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78 (1970) (holding jury not required to consist of twelve people); Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 186-89 (1968) (Harlan J., dissenting) (arguing that
trial by jury is not a requisite of due process and states should be allowed to
experiment with other methods of adjudicating guilt); MEMORANDUM, supra
note 2. See generally Amar, supra note 12; Jordan, supra note 7, at 1-2.
14
See e.g., Amar, supra note 12, at 1189-92 (1995) (presenting four
arguments in support of eliminating the unanimity requirement); Richard H.
Menard, Jr., Note, Ten Reasonable Men, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 179 (2001)
(suggesting eliminating the unanimity requirement would reduce incidents of
hung juries); Morehead, supra note 6 (proposing the elimination of the
unanimity requirement for jury verdicts); Osher, supra note 7 (discussing
California’s attempts to eliminate the unanimity requirement).
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share these sentiments.15 However, the elimination of the
unanimity requirement in New York would be another step toward
making New York’s right to a jury trial conform to the right as
protected in the U.S. Constitution.16 If achieved, this alignment
would eliminate the important distinctions between the New York
right and the federal right.
The New York right to a jury trial derives from the common
law right and, thus, reflects the political and social development of
New York State.17 The federal right, however, stems from a
political compromise between the federalists and anti-federalists,
and serves as a symbol of our federalist system of government. In
fact, the right to a jury trial is a central feature of our federalist
system.18 Therefore, in addition to eliminating the distinctive
characteristics of the New York right, altering the right would
upset the balance of our federalist system of government.19
Furthermore, eliminating the unanimity requirement and
altering the right to a jury trial as it is protected in the New York
Constitution would detract from the dual role the jury serves in our
federalist system. New York’s colonial history reflects the jury’s
function as both a political institution belonging to the people and
as a protector of individual liberties. The proposed amendment
threatens to reduce the jury’s ability to fill both of these roles.
Thus, before New York politicians respond to critics’ frustrations
and attacks on the jury system by eliminating the unanimity
requirement or making other alterations to the right to a jury, they
should first consider the origins of the right to a jury trial in this
country and its particular significance in New York’s history.
This note argues that, despite sharing a common historical
origin, the federal right to a jury trial and the New York right are
15

See MEMORANDUM, supra note 2.
For a discussion of the right to a jury trial in the U.S. Constitution see
infra Part I.
17
See infra Part II and Part III (reviewing the history of the right to a jury
in New York).
18
See infra Part I (discussing the role of the jury and the drafting of the
U.S. Constitution).
19
See infra Part.I.B. (describing the efforts to protect the right to a jury in
the Constitution).
16
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fundamentally distinct with regard to the role each plays in
government and society. Because of these differences and the
unique role that the jury played in New York’s political roots, New
York should offer more protection to the right than is provided
under the U.S. Constitution.20 This note also argues that the
consistent protection of the right to a jury trial in New York’s
constitution and the continued respect shown for it by New York
courts and the state legislature suggest that the right to a jury trial
in criminal cases is a fundamental right and, thus, should not be
altered.21 Part I of this note provides a brief historical overview of
the origin of the right to a jury trial in the United States. Part II
discusses the origin of the right in New York, tracing the colonial
development of the right from its first appearance in a code handed
down in 1665 by New York’s first colonial governor, to its
incorporation into New York’s constitution. Part III examines the
various New York constitutions and their consistent protection of
the right to a jury trial. Next, part IV analyzes how the right has
changed on a national level through a historical review of
amendments to the U.S. Constitution and seminal decisions by the
U.S. Supreme Court that altered the federal right to a jury trial.
Part V examines how these national changes influenced the right to
a jury trial in New York and discusses other changes to the state
right. Part VI explains why the proposed elimination of the
unanimity requirement is an ineffective means of addressing some
of the perceived problems with the jury system. In particular, this
section argues that the proposed change threatens to alter the right
to a jury trial in contravention of the right’s historical protection. It
further suggests that the amendment may pose serious
consequences for the integrity of jury verdicts and the rights of
criminal defendants. This note concludes with suggestions for how
New York’s legislature might improve the existing jury system
without eliminating the unanimity requirement and, in turn,
preserve the jury’s dual role as both a political institution and a
safeguard of individual liberty.
20

See U.S. CONST. art. III; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XLI; N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. VII, § 2;
N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 2; N.Y. CONST. of 1896, art. I, § 2; N.Y. CONST.
of 1938, art. I, § 2; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (McKinney’s 2004).
21
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I. RIGHT TO A JURY IN THE UNITED STATES
The right to a jury dramatically influenced the development
and structure of the American political system. This should not
surprise, given that Americans enjoyed the right to a jury trial from
the beginning of colonial times.22 In fact, Thomas Jefferson listed
the deprivation of the right to a trial by jury as one of the charges
against King George III of Great Britain in the Declaration of
Independence.23 A review of America’s early history provides
insight into why the Founding Fathers perceived the right to a jury
trial to be a vital component of the federalist system. Further, it
highlights some of the colonial experiences that shaped and later
influenced the Founding Fathers’ incorporation of the right in the
U.S. Constitution.
A. Coming to America and Finding a Home
The right to a jury trial fully emerged in England in the
fourteenth century.24 A typical criminal jury in England was
composed of twelve men from the local community and required a
unanimous verdict.25 The colonists wanted to incorporate this right
22

See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 152 (1968) (discussing the
colonial history of the jury trial and explaining that the “[j[ury trial came to
America with English colonists, and received strong support from them”);
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE PALLADIUM OF JUSTICE (1990); Rita James Simon,
Introduction, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 15 (Rita James Simon ed.,
1975); Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 870; Smith, supra note 12, 421-23.
23
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. Jefferson frames the violation in terms
of the King having allowed others to enact legislation that “depriv[es] us in
many cases of the benefits of trial by jury.” For a comprehensive history of the
making of the Declaration, see PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE:
MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1997).
24
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151-52; For a brief discussion on the historical
origins of the right to a jury, see LEVY, supra note 22.
25
LEVY, supra note 22, at 23, 46. These twelve men should be “persons of
good character, neighbors where the fact was committed, apprised of the
circumstances in question, and well acquainted with the lives and conversations
of the witnesses.” Id. Thus, the vicinage and unanimity requirement were
defining characteristics of the jury. Levy surmises that the requirement for a
unanimous verdict increased the authority of the verdict and ensured that the
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in colonial society.26 Accordingly, they sought to preserve the right
in early colonial constitutions.27 For example, the Virginia Charter
of 1606 granted the settlers of the Virginia colony all of the rights
held by an Englishman, including the right to a jury trial in both
criminal and civil cases.28 After 1641, the criminal system in
Massachusetts granted accused individuals the right “to choose
whether they will be tried by the Bensh or by a Jurie.”29
Additionally, the Colonial Constitution of Carolina, the Charter of
West New Jersey, and the Frame of Government of Pennsylvania
contained similar provisions preserving the right to a trial by
jury.30
Colonists viewed the right to a jury as derived from the
common law, that is, as one of the rights of civilized men to be
enjoyed by them as a result of their being Englishmen.31 However,
verdict was a true representation of the “voice” of the community. Id.
26
Harold M. Hyman & Catherine M. Tarrant, Aspects of American Trial
Jury History, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 24-25 (Rita James Simon ed.,
1975).
27
See, e.g., MASS. BODY OF LIBERTIES 29 (1641), reprinted in 1 BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENT HISTORY (1971);
FUNDAMENTAL CONST. OF CAROLINA (1669), 1 S.C. STATUTES AT LARGE 53
(Thomas Cooper ed., 1836); CHARTER OR FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF WEST NEW
JERSEY AGREED UPON (1676), reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATES
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLINIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3211 (F.N. Thorpe ed., 1906); FRAME OF
GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA (1682), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES 209-21 (Richard Perry ed., 1959).
28
LEVY, supra note 22, at 70. The Plymouth Colony also recognized this
right. Id.
29
MASS. BODY OF LIBERTIES, supra note 27, at 29.
30
See FUNDAMENTAL CONST. OF CAROLINA, supra note 27 (stating “no
cause, whether civil or criminal . . . shall be tried in any court of judicature,
without a jury of his peers”); CHARTER OR FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF WEST NEW
JERSEY AGREED UPON, supra note 27 (providing that all trials shall be decided
by a jury of twelve men from the community); FRAME OF GOVERNMENT OF
PENNSYLVANIA (1682) (drafted by William Penn), supra note 27, at 209-21
(stipulating that all trials be by a jury of twelve).
31
JULIUS GOEBEL JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
COLONIAL NEW YORK 605 (1970). See also MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE
SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 18

TULCHIN MACROED FINAL 2-28-05.DOC

434

3/14/2005 2:45 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

because of the colonies’ unique political and economic situation,
the right to a jury became the focus of the emerging power struggle
between the colonies and Great Britain. As a result, even though
the right to a jury trial was originally an individual right, it quickly
became an integral part of the American conception of liberty and
political independence.32 In fact, the colonists came to view the
right to a jury trial as fundamental to both their political and
judicial systems.33 The colonists felt so strongly about the right to a
jury trial that they included the denial of the right in the lists of
grievances in the Declaration of Independence.34
B. The Federalism Debate
Colonists and the Founding Fathers viewed the jury as both a
guardian of individual rights and as a republican body representing
self-government.35 Indeed, the representatives to the Philadelphia
(1986).
32

LEVY, supra note 22, at 69-70 (discussing the development of the right to
a jury in colonial Virginia, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island and New
York). See also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 109 (1998) [hereinafter
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS] (explaining that colonists relied on the jury because
they controlled it whereas they lacked “control over English Parliaments and
royal judges”).
33
See THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 442 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., Random House
1993) (describing the right to trial by jury as “the only anchor ever yet imagined
by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its
constitution”).
34
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776) (“ . . . for
depriving us in many cases of the benefits of trial by jury.”).
35
See AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 106 (“jury trial was
not simply and always an individual right but also an institution of localism and
popular sovereignty”); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 12627 (Richard D. Hefner ed., Penguin Books 1984) (1835) (jury as a political
institution); Amar, supra note 12, at 1170-72 (arguing that the right to jury
symbolizes popular sovereignty); Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First
Principles, 84 GEO. L. J. 641, 684 (1996). Amar believes that to the framers the
jury was “a political institution, embodying popular sovereignty and republican
self-government.” Id. See also Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 876;
Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative
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Constitutional Congress all agreed on the importance of the right to
a jury trial.36 The difficulty faced by the representatives involved
devising a way to protect the right in a manner that would be
suitable for both federalists and anti-federalists.37
Having fought a war for political independence, the former
colonies needed to develop a system of government that would
protect their hard-won freedoms while also preserving much of the
existing local systems of government. The failure of the Articles of
Confederation demonstrated the need for a federalist system of
government. Nevertheless, many colonists were wary of having to
forfeit their hard-won gains to a domineering federal
government.38 Cases such as that of John Peter Zenger also had a
Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 470-75 (1997).
36
According to Alexander Hamilton:
Friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in
nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury;
or if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former
regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the
very palladium of free government.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed.,
1961).
37
Id. The anti-federalists were wary of placing too much power in the
federal government and wanted the states to have more control over individual
liberties. See Essays by Cincinnatus (Nov. 1, 1787), reprinted in 6 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 11-12 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter
Essays by Cincinnatus] (Cincinnatus is believed to have been Richard Henry
Lee or his brother Arthur).
38
This fear is apparent in the debate over a federal judiciary. Hamilton
alludes to anti-federalists’ concern over judicial review and their fear that giving
appellate jurisdiction to the United States Supreme Court would allow federal
courts to intrude and obstruct state juries. THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander
Hamilton). See also Luther Martin, The Genuine Information Delivered to the
Legislature of the State of Maryland (1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 70-71 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). Martin believed that giving
appellate jurisdiction to the federal courts would result in the elimination of the
right to a jury trial in both civil and criminal cases. Id. at 70. He described the
right to a jury trial as “the surest barrier against arbitrary power, and the
palladium of liberty, —with the loss of which the loss of our freedom may be
dated.” Id. (emphasis in original). Many at the Constitutional Convention
thought the representatives did not go far enough in preserving the right to a
jury, in part because the Constitution also did not mention safeguarding the right
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profound influence on the emerging political debates in the
colonies.39
Zenger was a colonial newspaper editor who was arrested and
tried for seditious libel for publishing editorials that criticized the
Royal Governor of New York.40 In one of the first cases involving
jury nullification, the jury refused to follow the judge’s instructions
and issued a general verdict in Zenger’s favor.41 During the debate
over ratification of the U.S. Constitution, anti-federalists opposed
to ratification cited Zenger for fear that “under Article III of the
Constitution, the federal appellate courts might overrule a jury
verdict of not guilty.”42 Anti-Federalists most feared that
defendants like Zenger would be deprived of the right to a jury trial
under the Constitution.43 The concern over a potentially dominant
and intrusive federal government and the desire to protect
individual rights profoundly affected local political debate and
influenced the move to fortify the right to a jury trial at the state

to a jury trial in civil cases. One of the main reasons federalists wanted the right
to a jury in civil cases was because they viewed the jury as a deterrent for
political and judicial corruption. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander
Hamilton); Essays by Cincinnatus, supra note 37, at 11-12; LEVY, supra note
22, at 92-96; Amar, supra note 12, at 1169-70.
39
See infra Part.II.C.1.
40
For an excellent source for information on the Zenger trial, see JAMES
ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER
ZENGER (1963). Seditious libel is libel made with the intent of inciting treason or
other types of action against public authority and includes any acts to defame a
member of the royal family or the government. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 927,
1361 (7th ed. 1999). Seditious libel is no longer prosecuted. Id. at 927.
41
ALEXANDER, supra note 40, at 101.
42
Paul Finkelman, John Peter Zenger, New York, and the Origin of the Bill
of Rights, in NEW YORK AND THE UNION 72, 75-76 (Stephen L. Schechter &
Richard B. Bernstein eds., 1990).
43
See Essays by Cincinnatus, supra note 37, at 5-10. In an essay that
appeared in the New York Journal on November 1, 1787, the anti-federalist
author Cincinnatus argued against ratifying the Constitution. Id. at 5-6.
Cincinnatus believed the Constitution did not do enough to protect individual
liberties because it was “admirably framed for tyranny, that, by clear
construction, the judges might put the verdict of a jury out of the question.” Id.
at 9.
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level.44
Federalists believed the Constitution would protect the basic
rights of citizens and that it was an appropriate vehicle for listing
both the principles of government and fundamental liberties.45 The
anti-federalists, on the other hand, feared that a strong federal
government would threaten individual liberties, specifically the
right to a jury.46 They believed a political system based on popular
44

Id. See also AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 104-10;
Finkelman, supra note 42, at 76.
45
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 4 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter,
ed., 1961) (promising to explain “[t]he additional security which its [the
Constitution’s] adoption will afford to the preservation of that species of
government, to liberty and to property”) (emphasis in original). Some of the
federalists wanted to go further and include a bill of rights in the Constitution
(The Bill of Rights were later added as amendments). See THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 33, at 404-5 (listing “the omission of a bill of rights” that would
protect fundamental individual rights, including the right to a trial by jury, as
one of the major flaws of the new Constitution); Jefferson believed that “a bill of
rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth,
general or particular, and what no just government should refuse, or rest on
inference.” CURTIS, supra note 31, at 20.
46
Luther Martin, The Genuine Information Delivered to the Legislature of
the State of Maryland (1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, at 70-71
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). See also Essays by Cincinnatus, supra note 37, at
9, 11-13. Cincinnatus believed the Constitution did not do enough to protect
individual liberties because it was “admirably framed for tyranny, that, by clear
construction, the judges might put the verdict of a jury out of the question.” Id.
at 9. He worried that a strong central government would threaten individual
liberties (like the right to a jury trial), which traditionally were protected by the
states. Id. at 7-13.
Our state constitutions have held it [the right to a jury] sacred in all its
parts. They have anxiously secured it. But that these may not shield it
from the intended destruction in the new constitution . . . . Thus this
new system, with one sweeping clause [Supremacy Clause], bears
down every constitution in the union, and establishes its arbitrary
doctrines, supreme and paramount to all the bills and declarations of
rights, in which we vainly put our trust, and on which we rested the
security of our often declared, unalienable liberties.
Id. at 13. See also THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 404-5 (arguing that the
passage of a Bill of Rights was necessary because otherwise “Congress will
have the right to take away trials by jury”).
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sovereignty should place power at the local level.47 Moreover,
popular sovereignty would ensure that the people would be
involved in making the laws.48 As compared to the federalist
structure, the anti-federalist system offered more protection of, and
security for, individual liberties because it limited the federal
government’s powers with regard to local issues.49 For antifederalists, therefore, the federal constitution needed to reflect a
political system of government that would protect existing
institutions and ensure that the federal government would not
threaten individual liberties.50
C. Protecting the Right in the Federal Constitution
The fear of a strong federal government and the belief that the
right to a jury belonged to all citizens as a birthright helped to form
the constitutional protection of the jury system.51 The Founding
Fathers wanted to ensure that the jury remained both a political
institution and a protector of individual rights. Thus, they included
the right to a jury trial in criminal cases in the original drafts of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights.52 It is the only individual right
47

See Essays by Cincinnatus, supra note 37, at 11-13. Cincinnatus did not
believe the federal government should have power over the states. Id. at 13.
48
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 at 208-14 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter, ed., 1961) (discussing how the proposed Constitution conforms to the
republican principles of government).
49
See Essays by Cincinnatus, supra note 37, at 11-13.
50
See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2540 (2004) (noting “the
very reason the Framers put a jury-trial guarantee in the Constitution is that they
were unwilling to trust government to mark out the role of the jury”). Alexander
Hamilton alludes to this dilemma in his response to federalist concerns
regarding the lack of protection in the Constitution for civil juries. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). Because the right to a jury varied
from state to state, the representatives did not want to force the states to
conform. Id. Thomas Jefferson did not want to leave it to the states and instead
favored incorporating a bill of rights into the Constitution. CURTIS, supra note
31, at 18 (“Jefferson rejected the idea that trial by jury should not be guarantied
because some states have been so incautious as to abandon this mode of trial.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
51
See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540.
52
U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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to appear in both documents.53 This scheme represents a
compromise between the federalists and the anti-federalists.
The Constitution sets forth the general structure of our
government and the republican system, while the Bill of Rights
provides for the protection of individual liberties.54 Article III of
the Constitution provides that “[t]he trial of all [c]rimes, except in
[c]ases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.”55 The Framers intended
Article III to preserve the general idea of the jury as a political
entity and not as a protector of an individual defendant’s right to a
jury trial.56 Article III thus represents the idea of the jury as a
political institution.57 The clause does not mention individual
defendants, nor does it give any details concerning the
characteristics of the jury.58 In fact, the Framers included more
detailed provisions of the right to a jury trial in a draft of the
53

See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 870; Amar, supra note 12, at
1169-73. Amar agues that the right to a jury lies at the very heart of the Bill of
Rights. The right to a jury appears in Article III and the Fifth (grand jury), Sixth,
and Seventh Amendments. However, Amar also makes a case that the concept
of the right is found in the First, Second, Fourth and Ninth Amendments. Id.
With regard to the First Amendment, the jury protects freedom of speech and
individual liberties. See also infra Part III.C.1 (discussing the Zenger case). The
concept of the jury also may be found in the Second Amendments protection of
the right to bear arms. Amar, supra note 12, at 1170. The militia serves a similar
function as the jury in that they are both “collective, republican institutions” and
serving in the militia and on the jury were both rights of citizenship. Id.
54
This is not to say that the Constitution exclusively deals with structure or
that the Bill of Rights only contains provisions that deal with individual
liberties. For, as Amar points out, “both the Constitution and the Bill intertwine
rights and structure.” AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 180.
However, viewed as a whole, it is fair to say that the Constitution primarily
deals with structure while the Bill of Rights for the most part contains
provisions pertaining to rights.
55
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
56
This argument gains more weight when compared to the detailed rights
listed in the Sixth Amendment. See AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32,
at 105.
57
Id. at 104 (discussing the waiver of the right and arguing the right to a
jury trial should not be viewed “as an issue of individual right rather than . . . a
question of government structure”).
58
Id.
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Constitution, but these provisions did not appear in the final
version.59
Detailed provisions appear, however, in the Bill of Rights,
specifically, in the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.60 The
Framers drafted the Sixth Amendment to protect the individual
liberty aspect of the jury.61 The amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation . . . .62
The Sixth Amendment specifically mentions the “accused” and
lists the fundamental characteristics of the jury, such as the
requirement that it be “impartial” and that it be composed of
individuals drawn from the neighboring community (the vicinage
requirement).63 The Framers of the Constitution intended for the
Sixth Amendment to protect the local jury systems from the federal
government by requiring that juries be composed of people from

59

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 92-95 (1970). The Williams Court cites
this as evidence the framers did not intend to preserve the common law right in
its original form. Id. The Court used this argument as a basis for ruling that the
Constitution did not require states to have twelve member juries. Id.
60
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
61
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 106-7, 275 (arguing that
the Sixth Amendment guarantees specific attributes that benefit the accused that
are not protected in Article III).
62
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
63
Id. Amar argues that the main reason the Sixth Amendment appeared in
the Bill of Rights was for the vicinage requirement. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 32, at 105. However, the Sixth Amendment also can be seen as a
representative of the federalist ideal of broad separation of powers. See, e.g.,
Essays by Cincinnatus, supra note 37, at 11-13. The framers wanted to give
states control over the jury because it was a local institution that already existed
in the states. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). Indeed, New
York incorporated the common law form of the jury into its Constitution
ensuring that the right would be protected in that form from government
encroachment. See NY CONST. of 1777, art. XLI.
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the local community.64
II. THE RIGHT TO A JURY IN NEW YORK
Even before the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, most
states had firmly established the right to a jury trial in their judicial
systems.65 In fact, the development of the right in New York
during colonial times greatly influenced the drafters’ decision to
protect the jury in the state’s first Constitution.66 Through a series
of lively trials, the colonists in New York came to view the right to
a jury trial as a symbol of political independence and freedom that
served to protect them against an often hostile new government.
These experiences ultimately influenced the structure of the state
constitution and, thus, are helpful in understanding the origin of the
constitutional right to a jury in New York.67
A. Birth of the Right in Colonial New York
Henry Hudson, an employee of the Dutch East India Company,
sailed into New York harbor in 1609 and claimed the territory for
64

AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 105-6. Amar points out
that the anti-federalists were strong advocates of the Sixth Amendment’s
vicinage provision in part because the amendment resolved “the issue of which
moral community will sit in judgment over a crime.” Id. at 106. Because of this,
“[t]he Sixth Amendment thus operated as a federalism provision of sorts.” Id. at
275.
65
See, LEVY, supra note 22, at 90 (stating that the right to a jury trial was
already present in twelve state constitutions making it the most commonly
shared individual right, along with freedom of religion, among the states); see
also Amar, supra note 12, at 1169 (pointing out that the right to a jury in
criminal cases was the only right protected in all state constitutions written
between 1776 and 1787).
66
See 1 CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW
YORK (1906). Although dated, Lincoln’s five volume work remains the most
thorough and complete analysis of the historical development of New York’s
Constitution.
67
For information regarding the colonial history of New York, see
generally STEPHEN C. HUTCHINS, CIVIL LIST AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
THE COLONY AND STATE OF NEW YORK (Gaunt 2003) (1880); 1 LINCOLN, supra
note 66.
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the Dutch.68 The British government disputed this claim, as King
James I had previously granted the rights to this territory to two
English companies.69 Although the Dutch succeeded in
establishing a colony in the territory, the British presence in the
area continued to grow.70 In 1664, under threat of attack from
British troops, the Dutch surrendered the colony to the British.71
The British monarch, Charles II, then gave the territory to his
brother, the Duke of York, and the British renamed the colony
New York.72
Upon taking control of New York in 1665, Governor Richard
Nicolls called for a convention to discuss the state of the law and
government in the territory.73 At the convention, the governor
handed down a code called the “Duke’s Laws,” which was
generally compiled from existing laws and practices in the other
colonies.74 In addition to providing for a judicial system, these
laws contained a provision granting the right to a jury trial for “all
actions at law, and all criminal cases.”75 Juries were typically
composed of six or seven men, with the exception of capital cases,
in which twelve jurors were required.76 Through this code, in 1665,
the right to a jury trial was officially introduced in New York.
B. Colonial Statutory Development of the Right
As New York prospered, growing public sentiment and
68

HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 3-4.
Id. at 22; 1 LINCOLN, supra note 66, at 412.
70
HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 25-46. See also 1 LINCOLN, supra note 66,
at 411-21.
71
1 LINCOLN, supra note 66, at 421.
72
Id. at 421-22.
73
Id. at 423; HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 45.
74
1 LINCOLN, supra note 66, at 423; HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 45.
75
1 LINCOLN, supra note 66, at 459.
76
Id. at 459; see also LEVY, supra note 22, at 74. A majority verdict
sufficed in all non-capital cases. Id. The provision regarding the size of the jury
and the one stipulating a majority verdict differed from the English system,
which required twelve men juries and unanimous verdicts. PETER J. GALIE,
ORDERED LIBERTY 18 (1996).
69
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increased political pressure led the governor to form a General
Assembly in 1683.77 In its first act, the assembly passed a Charter
of Liberties and Privileges.78 Approved by the king in 1691, the
charter provided that “[a]ll Tryalls shall be by the verdict of twelve
men, and as neer as may be peers or Equalls. And of the
neighbourhood and in the County Shire or Division where the fact
Shall arise.”79 The Judiciary Act of 1691 reaffirmed this right to a
jury trial and stipulated that the jury was responsible for
determining questions of fact.80
Subsequent laws passed by the General Assembly maintained
the right as established by the Charter of Liberties.81 However, in
1732, the assembly passed a law allowing courts to try individuals
charged with petty offenses without a jury and, in 1768, a law was
passed eliminating juries in cases involving the theft of property
valued less than £5.82 Therefore, in 1776, when the Third
Provincial Congress appointed a committee to draft a constitution
for New York, the right to a jury trial already existed as a statutory
right.83
C. New York’s Colonial Jury in Action
An examination of various trials that took place during colonial
times provides valuable insight into how the colonial jury
functioned in practice and how colonists utilized the right to a jury
trial. Specific issues raised in these cases involved the role of the
jury, its limitations, and its function in society. More importantly,
these cases help to explain why the colonists in New York came to
view the jury as both a protector of individual liberties and as a
political body.
77

1 LINCOLN, supra note 66, at 460.
4 CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 39-40
(1906). See also HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 49-50.
79
CHARTER OF LIBERTIES AND PRIVILEGES of 1683 § 17 (1691), in 1
LINCOLN, supra note 66, at 101.
80
4 LINCOLN, supra note 78, at 40.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 40-41. This practice still can be seen today in New York.
83
Id. at 41. See also 1 LINCOLN supra note 66, at 478-79.
78
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1. The Zenger Trial

The well-publicized trial of printer John Peter Zenger
demonstrates the jury’s role as a bulwark against an oppressive
government. No case shaped public opinion about the right to a
jury more than Zenger’s. In 1735, Zenger, editor of the New York
Weekly Journal, published several articles criticizing the Royal
Governor of New York, William Cosby.84 The governor responded
by directing the attorney general to charge Zenger with seditious
libel.85 The grand jury thwarted the governor’s plan by refusing to
indict Zenger.86 The attorney general fired back, circumventing the
grand jury by using a special procedure to bring the charges
independently.87 A judge then set Zenger’s bail at an extremely
high amount; consequently, Zenger remained in prison for nearly
nine months before trial.88
One of the main issues presented at trial was the identity of the
publisher of the allegedly seditious articles.89 Zenger’s lawyer,
Andrew Hamilton, admitted that Zenger had published articles
criticizing the governor’s rule.90 By conceding this point, Hamilton
hoped the jury would consider the substantive issue of whether the
articles were also defamatory.91 Hamilton argued that the jury
should decide Zenger’s guilt based on its determination of the
veracity of the published articles.92 Chief Justice James DeLancey
refused to allow Hamilton to use this argument because, under
New York colonial law, truth was not a defense to seditious libel.93
Nevertheless, Hamilton directed his comments to the jury even
84

Nancy J. King, The American Criminal Jury, 62 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 41 (1999); see also LEVY, supra note 22, at 79.
85
King, supra note 84, at 41. For a definition of seditious libel see supra
note 40.
86
King, supra note 84, at 41.
87
Id. See also Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 872.
88
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 872.
89
Finkelman, supra note 42, at 75.
90
ALEXANDER, supra note 40, at 62.
91
Finkelman, supra note 42, at 75.
92
LEVY, supra note 22, at 80-81.
93
Id. See also ALEXANDER, supra note 40, at 62.
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though his argument directly conflicted with the Chief Justice’s
instructions. 94 Hamilton hoped to play to the jury’s sympathy and
sought to portray his client as a victim of a vindictive and corrupt
government official.95 The judge, however, instructed the jury to
consider only whether Zenger had published the articles.96
Disregarding the judge’s instructions, the jury issued a general
verdict acquitting Zenger, prompting “three huzzahs” from the
crowded courtroom.97
By voting with their consciences, the jurors effectively
nullified seditious libel in New York.98 The judge had instructed
the jury to apply the law of seditious libel as it was written, but the
jury chose to ignore these instructions and returned a general
verdict of not guilty.99 By issuing a general verdict, the jury
circumvented the colonial government’s attempts to use seditious
libel laws as a tool to repress free speech. In addition, the jury
demonstrated its power to protect individual liberties from a hostile
government through its refusal to apply a law it deemed unjust.100
2. Forsey v. Cunningham
The case of Forsey v. Cunningham illustrates the role of the
jury as a political institution and illustrates how the jury legitimizes
the legal process.101 This case stems from a fight that occurred on
July 28, l763, between two New York merchants, Thomas Forsey
and Waddel Cunningham.102 During the fight, Cunningham injured
Forsey by stabbing him with a sword.103 For his actions, officials
94

LEVY, supra note 22, at 80.
Hamilton knew that the jury had the power to determine the facts,
interpret the law, and apply them in this case. ALEXANDER, supra note 40.
96
Id.
97
ALEXANDER, supra note 40, at 101.
98
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 874.
99
LEVY, supra note 22, at 81.
100
Id.
101
See Herbert A. Johnson, George Harison’s Protest: New Light on
Forsey versus Cunningham, 50 N.Y. Hist. 61, 64-65 (1969).
102
Id. at 64.
103
Id.
95
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charged Cunningham with assault and battery and fined him
£50.104 The fine did not put an end to the incident, as Forsey also
filed a civil suit against Cunningham seeking damages.105 A jury
found Cunningham liable for the injuries and awarded Forsey
damages.106
Cunningham refused to accept the jury’s verdict and demanded
a new trial.107 The court denied his motion and Cunningham
appealed to the Supreme Court of the Judicature for the colony of
New York.108 The court rejected his appeal based on the absence of
a writ of error.109 The court noted that neither party had entered
procedural objections during the trial and thus concluded that the
trial was fair.110
After the court denied his motion for a new trial, Cunningham
used his political connections and appealed for a rehearing by the
Lieutenant Governor of New York, Cadwallader Colden, and his
governing council.111 The court, with the agreement of the attorney
general, stated that the council’s jurisdiction extended only to
appeals in cases of error.112 Thus, because Cunningham had
appealed the verdict on the facts and not the law, neither Colden
nor the council had jurisdiction over the case.113
The Lieutenant Governor, on the other hand, believed the court
could overrule the jury if the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence.114 Further, he believed that he could issue a writ of error
104

Id.
Id. In addition to medical costs and treatment, Forsey alleged that his
injuries forced him to miss work. Forsey estimated the total costs to be £5000.
Id.
106
HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 101.
107
Id. See also Johnson, supra note 101, at 64-66.
108
Johnson, supra note 101, at 64-66.
109
Id. at 65-66. At common law and in colonial New York, appeals were
only permitted on a writ of error. Id. Defendants could not appeal a judgment on
the facts of a case. Id. Colden ordered the Supreme Court to explain its ruling.
HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 101.
110
Johnson, supra note 101, at 68.
111
Id. See also Johnson, supra note 101, at 64-66.
112
HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 101.
113
Johnson, supra note 101, at 68. See HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 101.
114
William E. Nelson, The Jury and Consensus Government in Mid105
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and rehear the facts of the case.115 In Colden’s view, justice and the
law came from the king and as the “King’s representative in the
Province [he] should function as the guarantor of the liberties of all
the King’s people.”116 When the council sided with the judges,
Colden asked the king and his governing council to intervene.117
The king decided to intervene and issued a rule permitting
appeals to the governor “from verdicts of juries on questions of
fact.”118 However, the court considered an appeal of that nature
illegal and refused to comply with the king’s command.119 The
General Assembly shared the court’s concerns and explained that
“an appeal from the verdict of a jury is subversive of that right [to
trial by jury].”120 The assembly passed a resolution affirming the
right to a jury trial and reinforced the idea that the governor lacks
the power to interfere with or to overturn a jury’s verdict.121
3. The Trial of Nicholas Bayard and John Hutchins
The understanding of a jury trial as delivering a verdict of
one’s peers formed the main point of controversy in the trial of
Nicholas Bayard and John Hutchins.122 Bayard was a political
activist who lived in New York during the early 1700s.123 He
disagreed with the colonial government on several issues involving
taxation, freedom of the press, and governance, and sent critical

Eighteenth-Century America, at http://www.constitution.org/jury/pj/ nelson.htm
(last modified July 10, 2002) (citing Cadwallader Colden to the Earl of Halifax,
in 7 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK 682-84 (E. O’Callaghan ed., Albany: Weed Parsons and Co. 1856)).
115
Johnson, supra note 101, at 69-70.
116
Id. at 69.
117
Id. at 71-72.
118
HUTCHINS, supra note 67, at 101.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. See also Johnson, supra note 101, at 74-75. Johnson points out that
political developments may have been the real reason behind Colden’s defeat.
Id.
122
LEVY, supra note 22, at 77.
123
Id.
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letters to the British Parliament and the king.124 In his political
debates, Bayard often enlisted the help of his friend John Hutchins,
who owned a tavern that served as a gathering place for local
debates and political discussions.125 The Lieutenant Governor of
New York, John Nanfan, attempted to stop the two men from
holding their meetings by demanding that Hutchins hand over any
political manifestos and other documents in his possession.126
When Hutchins refused, Nanfan had both Hutchins and Bayard
arrested for treason.127
In 1702, a jury convicted the men of treason.128 The judge
subsequently denied the defendants’ appeal on the grounds that an
impartial jury had found them guilty.129 Regardless, the men
continued to protest their convictions and appealed to Queen Anne
of England.130 The men argued that their convictions should be
overturned because the verdict was in error.131 They claimed that
the error was due in part to the fact that foreigners had served on
the jury.132 The men demanded to be retried by a jury of their
peers.133 The queen’s ministers agreed to set aside the
convictions.134 Bayard then tried to have the judge “arrested for
misconduct” for failing to prevent the error, but the judge argued
that the jury was responsible because it had rendered the verdict.135
The jury refused to discuss its verdict and the matter was
dropped.136

124

Id.
Id.
126
Id.
127
LEVY, supra note 22, at 77.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
LEVY, supra note 22, at 77. Apparently a couple of the jurors were
Dutch and admitted that they were ignorant of English law. Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
125
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III. PROTECTING THE RIGHT: TRIAL BY JURY AND THE NEW YORK
CONSTITUTION
As evidenced by practice, the colonial jury did not hesitate to
demonstrate its independence when pressured by judges or
politicians.137 By refusing to convict fellow citizens believed to be
wrongly accused or imprisoned, the jury acted as a bulwark against
government tyranny.138 However, relying on the jury to protect
individual liberties and freedoms did not completely insulate
citizens from wrongful prosecutions. As was the case in Britain,
most significantly through the acts of government-appointed
judges, the government continued to wield significant influence
over juries.139 Judges often exerted pressure on juries to ensure that
the verdicts they rendered conformed to government policy.140 In
many cases, the government circumvented the jury entirely by
creating new tribunals authorized to try cases without a jury.141
In light of these experiences, the drafters of the New York
Constitution sought to ensure that the citizens of New York would
enjoy the unfettered right to a jury trial.142 The drafters of the New
York Constitution believed the right to a jury trial was a
fundamental right and sought to codify the right within their
political system.143 When it came time for the citizens of New
York to form their own government, representatives believed that a

137

See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the Zenger trial)
LEVY, supra note 22, at 82, 85.
139
See LEVY, supra note 22, at 61. During the trial of William Penn, the
judge threatened jurors refusing to issue a guilty verdict with fines and
imprisonment. Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 83-86. See also Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 875
(discussing British attempts to reduce the power of the colonial jury). Both the
Stamp Act of 1765 and the Townshend Act of 1767 attempted to reduce the
impact of colonial juries by expanding the jurisdiction of nonjury Admiralty
Courts.
142
See infra Part III.B.
143
LEVY, supra note 22, at 85. See also People v. Cosmos, 205 N.Y. 91, 95
(1912). “The sacredness and importance of the right to trial by jury is attested by
the arrangement, no less than by the language, of our Constitution.” Id. at 95.
138
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constitution would best preserve the right to a trial by jury.144
A. Due Process and the Right to a Jury
In 1776, the drafters gathered in White Plains during the
Revolutionary War to develop a written blueprint for the
establishment of a government for the future state of New York.145
In addition to designing a formal governmental structure, the
representatives sought to ensure that the constitution would protect
fundamental individual liberties.146 As a starting point, the drafters
guaranteed that citizens would enjoy the right to due process of
law.147 Borrowing from the Magna Carta, the New York
Constitution protected citizens from the denial of their rights
“unless in accord with the law of the land or judgment of peers.”148
B. The First New York Constitution
The colonists’ concept of due process arose from a
combination of their beliefs in “the natural rights of man and the
historic rights of Englishmen.”149 Although the right to a jury trial
was a central characteristic of due process, the due process clause
of the state constitution did not “necessarily import[] a jury trial as
part of the process.”150 For this reason, the colonists sought to
144

Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2540 (2004) (noting “the very
reason the Framers put a jury-trial guarantee in the Constitution is that they were
unwilling to trust government to mark out the role of the jury”).
145
1 LINCOLN, supra note 66, at 471-98. The drafters first met in the
summer of 1776. Id.
146
1 LINCOLN, supra note 66, at 471-98.
147
N.Y. CONST. of 1777, §13. See also Wynehamer v. The People, 13 N.Y.
378, 432 (1856) (discussing the due process clause); People v. Irizarry, 53
N.Y.S.2d 630, 633 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (discussing the due process clause in
the New York Constitution and its significance to the right to a jury trial).
148
N.Y. CONST. of 1777, §13. Section 13 reads, “no member of this state
shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to
any citizen thereof, unless by law of the land or the judgment of his peers.” Id.
(emphasis added).
149
CURTIS, supra note 31, at 18.
150
Wynehamer v. The People, 13 N.Y. 378, 425 (1856).
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expressly protect the right within the state constitution.151 Their
struggles with the British government had taught them that
statutory protection was insufficient to preserve the right to a jury
because the legislature could change the law and judges could
exert pressure on juries.152 By specifically protecting the right to a
jury trial in the New York Constitution, the framers hoped to
protect the right from government circumvention and judicial
interference.153
Article 41 of the 1777 Constitution reflected the concerns of
the drafters. It provides:
Trial by jury, in all cases in which it hath heretofore been
used in the colony of New York, shall be established, and
remain inviolate forever. And that no act of attainder shall
be passed by the legislature of this state, for crimes other
than those committed before the termination of the present
war; and that such acts shall not work a corruption of
blood. And further, that the legislature of this state, shall, at
no time hereafter, institute any new court or courts, but
such as shall proceed according to the course of common
law.154
The first sentence of Article 41 incorporates the right as it already
existed in the colony at the time of independence.155 Although
Article 41 fails to specify the types of cases covered by the right,
the drafters clarified the matter in Article 35, which guaranteed
151

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 4 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter, ed., 1961) (promising to explain “[t]he additional security which its
[the Constitution’s] adoption will afford to the preservation of that species of
government, to liberty and to property”) (emphasis in original).
152
See, e.g., infra Part II.C (discussing instances in which politicians and
judges tried to influence the outcome of jury trials). See also AMAR, THE BILL
OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 109 (pointing out that “distrust of judges lingered
on in America”).
153
People v. Dunn, 157 N.Y. 528, 533 (1899) (stating that the
constitutional right to a jury trial and due process “were imposed by the people
as restraints upon the power of the legislature”).
154
NY CONST. of 1777, art. XLI.
155
4 LINCOLN, supra note 78, at 39. See also People v. Dunn, 157 N.Y.
528, 533 (1899) (pointing out that the clause “simply preserved the right as it
had been exercised before the adoption of the organic law of the state”).
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that both the common law of Great Britain and New York colonial
law in effect at the time of the revolution “shall be and continue
the law of this state.”156 Thus, cases arising under English common
law and New York colonial law that previously required a jury trial
continued to receive protection under the state constitution.157
Importantly, the state legislature could not alter or modify this
constitutional right.158
The representatives also drafted Article 41 to prohibit the
legislature from instituting new courts that did not conform to

156

See N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXV. Article 35 provides in relevant
parts:
That such parts of the common law of England, and of the statute law
of England and great Britain, and of the acts of the legislature of the
colony of New York, as together did form the law of the said
colony . . . shall be and continue the law of this state, subject to such
alterations and provisions as the legislature of this state shall, from time
to time, make concerning the same. . . . That all such parts of the said
common law, and all such of the statutes and acts aforesaid, or parts
thereof, as may be construed to establish or maintain any particular
denomination of Christians or their ministers, or concern the allegiance
heretofore yielded to, and the supremacy, sovereignty, government, or
prerogatives claimed or exercised by, the King of Great Britain and his
predecessors, over the colony of New York and its in habitants, or are
repugnant to this Constitution, be and they hereby are, abrogated and
rejected.
Id.
157
For example, all felonies would be tried with a jury because under
common law defendants accused of a felony had the right to a jury trial. See also
People v. Justices of the Court of Special Sessions of New York, 74 N.Y. 406
(1878). In this case the defendant had been tried before a Court of Special
Sessions without a jury for assault and battery. Id. at 406. The judge found the
defendant guilty and sentenced him to four months in jail. Id. The defendant
appealed and argued that “he had the constitutional right of trial by jury which
he did not and could not waive.” Id. The Court of Appeals determined that the
defendant did not have a constitutional right to a jury in this case because jury
trials were not “used at the time of the adoption of the present Constitution in
trials by courts of special sessions for the offense charged against the relator
[defendant] in this case.” Id. Thus, the constitutional right to a jury trial did not
extend to these types of cases. Id. See also 4 LINCOLN, supra note 78, at 39.
158
4 LINCOLN, supra note 78, at 39.
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common law rights.159 Specifically, representatives sought to
prevent the reestablishment of the admiralty courts, which
historically were created by the King of England to circumvent the
right to trial by jury.160 This reflected the drafters’ belief that
common law rules should apply to the new court system, thus
insulating these rights from “the reach of legislative
subversion.”161
Criminal trials in particular were to be “regulated and
conducted . . . not by statutes, but by common law.”162 During the
convention, the representatives rejected two provisions that would
have altered these qualities.163 One provision would have
eliminated the unanimity requirement for jury verdicts, while
another provision would have allowed jury verdicts by a threefourths majority.164 To the framers, the common law right to a jury
meant the right to a jury of twelve men and a unanimous verdict
for conviction.165 Since that time, New York courts have followed
the intent of the framers by consistently protecting the right to a

159

See N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XLI (providing that “the legislature of
this state shall, at no time hereafter, institute any new court or courts, but such as
shall proceed according to the course of the common law”).
160
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 870-71; See also Smith, supra note
12, at 424 n.184.
161
People v. Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. 378, 446 (1856). See also People v.
Dunn, 157 N.Y. 528, 533 (1899) (explaining that the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing the right to a jury trial and due process “were imposed by the
people as restraints upon the power of the legislature”).
162
Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 446.
163
1 LINCOLN, supra note 66, at 547.
164
Id. The representatives defeated the measure by a 28-3 vote.
165
See People v. Page, 88 N.Y.2d 1, 5 (1996) (noting that “[a] legal jury
according to the common law consisted of 12 persons”); People v. Cosmos, 205
N.Y. 91, 96 (1912) (stating that “[f]rom time immemorial, a common-law jury
has consisted of 12 men.”); People v. Justices of the Court of Special Sessions of
N.Y., 74 N.Y. 406, 407 (1878) (noting a “common law jury of twelve men”);
People v. Cancemi, 18 N.Y. 128 (1858) (holding that “[a] legal jury, according
to common law, consists of twelve persons”); People v. Sanabria, 249 N.Y.S.2d
66, 71-72 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964) (stating “this [right to jury] provision
guaranteed, by implication, a unanimous verdict in a jury trial”) (citations
omitted).
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jury trial from legislative and judicial actions.166
C. Subsequent Constitutions and the Right to a Jury
New York has protected the right to a jury trial from the very
beginning of its history. Representatives to the state constitutional
convention made sure to include the right in New York’s first
constitution. An analysis of the state’s subsequent constitutions
reveals that New York’s constitutional guarantee to the right to a
jury remains relatively unchanged since its original drafting.167
166

See Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 427. In Wynehamer, the New York Court of
Appeals struck down a statute prohibiting the sale of liquor without a license. Id.
The Court held the statute violated the constitutional right to a jury trial because
under the law violators would be tried either by magistrate judges without a jury
or by a jury of six men. Id. See also People v. Page, 88 N.Y.2d 1, 3 (1996)
(holding defendant’s waiver of right to a jury trial was invalid because the
defendant’s consent did not “conform with the statutory mandate”); People v.
Davidson, 525 N.Y.S.2d 855 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (holding defendant’s
waiver of his right to jury trial was improper as the defendant failed to comply
with requirements set forth in the New York Constitution). In People v.
Cancemi, the Court of Appeals overturned a murder conviction because it
determined that the defendant had improperly waived his right to a jury trial. 18
N.Y. 128 (1858). A jury had convicted the defendant, Michael Cancemi, of
murder. Id. at 130. During the trial one of the jurors had been excused. Id. at
130-31. As a result, only a jury of eleven entered a verdict. The State argued that
because Cancemi consented to having his case heard by only eleven jurors there
was no error. Id. at 135. The court held that an individual criminal defendant
could not waive his right to a jury trial. Id. at 138. The court believed that
because criminal cases “involve public wrongs,” the State and the community
have an interest in the proceedings. Id. at 136-37. It should be pointed out that
Judge Strong believed the court should not allow for juries composed of less
than twelve in criminal cases. Id. at 135.
167
Compare N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XLI (providing “[t]rial by jury, in
all cases in which it hath heretofore been used in the colony of New York, shall
be established, and remain inviolate forever”) with N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art.
VII, § 2 (providing “trial by jury, in all cases in which it has been heretofore
used, shall remain inviolate forever”), N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. I, § 2
(providing “trial by jury, in all cases in which it has been heretofore used, shall
remain inviolate forever”), N.Y. CONST. of 1894, art. I, § 2 (providing that “[t[he
trial by jury in all cases in which it has been heretofore used shall remain
inviolate forever”), N.Y. CONST. of 1938, art. I, § 2 (stating “[t]rial by jury in all
cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision
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This is especially significant, given the relative ease with which
New York’s constitution can be amended. Moreover, this
consistency underscores the fundamental nature of the right and its
perceived importance to New York’s political and judicial system.
1. Amending the Constitution
The first constitution lacked an explicit clause or instructions
regarding the amendment of the document.168 Indeed, nearly fifty
years passed before the New York State legislature succeeded in
calling for a constitutional convention to amend the 1777
Constitution.169 Later constitutions expressly provided for ways to
amend the document.170 As of 2003, the amendment process
requires a majority vote by the legislature in two consecutive
legislative sessions.171 After approving a proposed amendment, the
legislature then submits it to the citizens of New York for a vote.172
The New York Constitution also requires voters to consider every
twenty years whether to hold a constitutional convention.173
Although more than 200 amendments have been made to the New
York Constitution of 1894, the protection of the right to a jury trial
in criminal cases has undergone few changes since the first
constitution.174

shall remain inviolate forever”), and N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (McKinney’s 2004)
(providing the right to “[t]rial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been
guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever”). See also
People v. Dunn, 157 N.Y. 528, 533 (1899) (stating that “[t]he guaranty of the
trial by jury is substantially the same as it stood in the original Constitution”).
168
See N.Y. CONST. of 1777.
169
1 LINCOLN, supra note 66, at 613-29.
170
GALIE, supra note 76, at 4.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 2 (McKinney’s 2004).
174
GALIE, supra note 76, at 4-5. Comparatively, the U.S. Constitution has
twenty-seven amendments, ten of which were added in 1791 (our Bill of Rights)
leaving only seventeen amendments in over 200 years.
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2. Amendments to the Right to a Jury Trial

Although the basic formulation of the right to a jury trial has
experienced few revisions since New York’s first constitution,
subsequent constitutions have incorporated various procedural
changes to the right.175 For example, delegates to the second
convention in 1821 slightly altered the right by eliminating both
the references to practices used in colonial New York and the
prohibition against crimes of attainder.176 However, the delegates
retained the provision preventing the legislature from establishing
new criminal courts.177 The right as it appeared in Article VII,
Section 2 states:
The trial by jury, in all cases in which it has been
heretofore used, shall remain inviolate forever; and no new
court shall be instituted, but such as shall proceed
according to the course of the common law; except such
courts of equity as the legislation is herein authorized to
establish.178
Courts have interpreted the use of the word “heretofore” broadly to
allow for jury trials in “such new and like cases as might
afterwards arise.”179 These courts determined that the purpose of
the law was to expand a private right rather than restrict it.180 Thus,
when New York adopted a new constitution in 1821, the right to a
jury trial continued to receive the same protection as it did under

175

Although the composition of the jury has changed dramatically since
colonial times, these changes did not occur as a result of constitutional acts so I
will not discuss those changes here.
176
See e.g., N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. VII, § 2.
177
Id. This is due to the fundamental differences between civil suits and
criminal prosecutions.
178
Id.
179
Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 426. For example, if the legislature passes a law
creating a new felony, a person charged under that crime would have the right to
a jury trial because under common law all felonies are tried by a jury.
Conversely, an individual charged with a misdemeanor is not entitled to a jury
because in colonial times misdemeanors could be tried without a jury.
180
Id. at 426-27.
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previous constitutions.181
At the 1846 convention, the delegates made a single change to
the Constitution of 1846 and removed the prohibition against the
establishment of new courts.182 In 1894, New Yorkers amended the
Constitution to permit parties in a civil case to waive the right to a
jury trial.183 In 1935, the New York State legislature passed and
enacted an amendment that eliminated the unanimity requirement
for juries in civil cases.184 Building on this perceived move to
reduce the power of the jury, the delegates introduced a provision
that would allow defendants to waive a jury trial in all criminal
cases “except those in which the crime charged may be punishable
by death.”185
This waiver provision represented the most significant change
in the right to a jury trial in New York’s history. It also proved the
most controversial because many believed that the right to a jury
was so inherently fundamental that it could not be waived.186 In
fact, the citizens of New York were so concerned about limiting
the use of the waiver that they passed a second amendment that
same year imposing several procedural safeguards.187 Following
this amendment, the state constitution, various statutes, and courts
required waivers to be in writing, signed by the defendant, in

181

Id. at 427.
Compare N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. VII, § 2 with N.Y. CONST. of 1846,
art. I, § 2.
183
N.Y. CONST. of 1894, art. I, § 2. The trial by jury in all cases in which it
has been heretofore used shall remain inviolate forever; but a jury trial may be
waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner prescribed by law. Id.
184
GALIE, supra note 76, at 205.
185
N.Y. CONST. of 1938, art. I, § 2. See also Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276
(1930) (waiver of the right to a trial by jury in criminal cases does not violate the
U.S. Constitution).
186
See infra Part V.A. (discussing New York’s waiver provision).
187
People v. Page, 88 N.Y.2d 1, 5-6 (1996). The new amendment required
that the defendant sign a written waiver “in person in open court before and with
the approval of a court having jurisdiction to try the offense.” Id. at 6. This
requirement was necessary because it helped to ensure the defendant had
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her right to a jury trial.
Id.
182
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person, in open court, before and with the approval of the court.188
In 1938, New York also passed an amendment eliminating the
reliance on the common law protection of the right to a jury trial as
it relates to due process, bringing the right completely within the
constitution.189 More recent changes include the adoption of a
unified court system and the provision of discretion to the
legislature in regulating the size of juries in all cases except those
involving indictment.190
IV. THE CHANGING JURY
Colonists and the Founding Fathers believed the jury served
dual roles in society: the jury was a political body capable of
enforcing the principle of separation of powers, and it served as a
protector of individual liberties.191 The Founding Fathers
recognized the importance of the right to a jury trial and viewed
the jury as a central part of the American federalist system of
government.192 Drawing on this understanding of the right, the
Founding Fathers structured the Constitution to incorporate the
dual role of the jury in American society and to protect its place in
188

These requirements still apply today. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2
(providing the right “may be waived by the defendant in all criminal cases . . .
by a written instrument signed by the defendant in person in open court before
and with the approval of a judge.”); N.Y. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW § 320.10
(McKinney 2003); see also Page, 88 N.Y.2d at 11 (reversing defendant’s
conviction because the defendant’s waiver was invalid); People v. Duchin, 12
N.Y.2d 351, 353 (1963) (discussing the requirements for a waiver); People v.
Davidson, 525 N.Y.S.2d 855, 858 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (holding the
defendant’s waiver invalid as it did not conform to the constitutional and
statutory requirements).
189
N.Y. CONST. of 1938, art. I, § 2. Trial by jury in all cases in which it has
heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate
forever. Id. (emphasis added).
190
Burton C. Agata, Criminal Justice, in DECISION 1997: CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE IN NEW YORK, 257 (Gerald Benjamin & Henrik Dullea eds., 1997).
191
THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter, ed., 1961) (the jury was “a valuable safeguard to liberty” and “the very
palladium of free government”).
192
See THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 442; THE FEDERALIST NO.
83, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).
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the federalist system.193
The Founding Fathers recognized that in order to be an
effective political body, the jury would have to remain separate
from the other parts of the government. Article III of the U.S.
Constitution codified the notion of the jury as a political
institution.194 Specifically, Article III referred to the trial of “all
crimes,” implying that the jury forms an integral part of the judicial
system.195 The Sixth Amendment assured the federal government’s
protection of the right by securing the individual rights aspect of
the jury; however, it left the specific definitions and actual
implementation of the right to the states.196 Implicit in the
amendment is the anti-federalist view that the states were better
positioned than the federal government to protect individual
liberties.197
193

See infra Part I.C. (discussing the drafting of the Constitution to protect
the right to a jury trial)
194
Id. Article III states in part that “[t]he trial of all [c]rimes, except in
[c]ases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.” U.S. CONST. art. III. See also
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 12, at 927 (concluding that “[o]nly a shadow of
this communitarian institution has survived”); Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging
the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory
Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 48 (2003) (arguing “[t]he placement of the
criminal jury in Article III highlights that the criminal jury is not a constitutional
afterthought, but a central institution in the operation of the government”).
195
AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 105 (stating that “[t]he words
in the Article III jury clause were plainly understood during the ratification
period as words of obligation”).
196
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. For this reason, juries differed from state to
state and the right to a jury trial signified different things from state to state.
King, supra note 84, at 43.
197
People v. Irizarry, 536 N.Y.S.2d 630, 633 n.2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988). The
anti-federalists believed “[s]tate Constitutions in general, and the New York
Constitution in particular, have long safeguarded any threat to individual
liberties, irrespective of from what quarter that peril arose.” Id. (quoting
Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 159 (1978)). See also
Essays by Cincinnatus, supra note 37, at 13 (arguing that “[o]ur state
constitutions have held it [the right a jury trial] sacred in all its parts . . . [and]
[t]hey have anxiously secured it.”). In fact, before Duncan v. Louisiana, the
Sixth Amendment only applied to the federal government. 391 U.S. 145, 149
(1968). The Court in Duncan held the right to a jury trial is a fundamental right
that falls within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
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Despite the fact that states were not required to protect the
right,198 juries remained a central part of the local political
foundation of our country.199 This is not the case today. The jury
no longer wields such profound influence on our political and
judicial systems.200 Indeed, an increasing number of individuals
view the jury as an accessory rather than an integral part of the
judicial system.201 Furthermore, many people have come to view
the right to a jury in one-dimensional terms as a defendant’s right
as opposed to a basic political right of all citizens.202 This change
has occurred gradually and is due to several different factors,
including the development of the legal profession and professional
judiciary, the passage of the Civil War Amendments, various U.S.
198

See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 604-5 (1900). In Maxwell, the
Court upheld a provision in Utah’s Constitution providing for an eight-person
jury. The Court felt the issue of juries should be left to the states to decide. Id.
As long as states provided a means for which criminal and civil actions could be
resolved fairly then the Court would not get involved. Id. at 604-5. See also
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930) (holding that the right to a
jury may be waived and that a state may decide to try a case without a jury).
199
See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2539 (2004) (stating the
right to a jury trial is “a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional
structure” and it “is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary”); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (noting the jury acted as “an inestimable
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the
compliant, biased, or eccentric judge”).
200
See AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 97, 109 (stating that
once “[j]uries stood at the center of the original Bill of Rights, but sit on the
periphery today” and “the present-day jury is only a shadow of its former self”);
Barkow, supra note 194, at 34 (stating “[t]oday, however, the jury’s role as a
check on the government’s power has become far more limited”).
201
WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIAL WITHOUT TRUTH 216 (1999) (criticizing the
American justice system for not giving juries more help because “jurors are
children who cannot be trusted to make . . . decisions for themselves”).
202
See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972) (holding “the interest
of the defendant in having the judgment of his peers interposed between himself
and the officers of the State who prosecute and judge him is equally well
served” by a less than unanimous jury verdict); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 100 (1970) (stating that the “essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the
interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment
of a group of laymen”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968) (stating
the jury assures “that fair trials are provided for all defendants”).
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Supreme Court decisions interpreting the right to a jury trial, and
changes to state constitutional protections of the right. The result is
that today’s jury bears little resemblance to its common law
predecessor.203
A. The Diminishing Power of the Jury
Apart from the overall composition and inclusiveness of the
modern jury, the greatest change has been the decline of the jury’s
substantive powers.204 The colonial jury and its American
successor played an active role in the justice system.205 Until the
middle of the nineteenth century, juries in the United States
203

AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 108 (arguing that “even
the core role of the jury in criminal trials has seriously eroded over the past two
centuries”).
204
For the purposes of this note, I am focusing solely on the substantive
decision making power of the jury rather than on its composition. I do not mean
to diminish the magnitude of allowing women and minorities to serve on the
jury. In fact, a large body of Supreme Court cases deal with this issue. See, e.g.,
Batson v, Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that equal protection prevents
a party from using peremptory challenges based on race); Castaneda v. Partida,
430 U.S. 482 (1977) (holding that Mexican-Americans composing nearly 80
percent of a county’s population yet only making up 39 percent of persons
summoned for grand jury duty was prima facie case of discrimination); Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (striking down a Louisiana law excluding
women from the jury); Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970) (holding
exclusion of blacks from jury service violated the idea of a jury); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (striking down a West Virginia law that
only allowed white men to serve on juries). For an overview of New York’s
progression and struggle with inclusion, see Frederick T. Kelsey, Note and
Comment, Gender Based Peremptory Challenges and the New York State
Constitution, 8 TOURO L. REV. 91, 93-98 (1991).
205
See Nancy S. Marder, Juries and Technology: Equipping Jurors for the
Twenty-First Century, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1257, 1264-65 (2001) (stating that
“jurors in this country played a more active role than they do today”); Smith,
supra note 12, at 449-50 (noting that the “role of the jury during the course of a
trial in America originally was much greater than that of the modern American
jury”); Roger M. Young, Using Social Science to Assess the Need for Jury
Reform in South Carolina, 52 S.C. L. Rev. 135, 145-47 (observing that “early
American juries played a much greater role in determining the law than their
modern counterparts”).
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determined both questions of law and questions of fact.206 The first
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, John Jay, alluded to this
power when he instructed the jury in Georgia v. Brailsford, a civil
case, that it had the right “to determine the law as well as the fact
in controversy.”207 In determining questions of law, the jury acted
as a check on the judiciary and the government and, consequently,
wielded great power.208 This is best illustrated by the Zenger trial,
in which the jury used this power to determine that Zenger’s
actions did not constitute seditious libel.209
The power of the jury to determine questions of law derived, in
206

See Letters from the Federal Farmer (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 319-20 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter
Letters from the Federal Farmer] (stating “it is the established right of the jury
by the common law, and the fundamental laws of this country . . . to decide both
as to law and fact.”); LEVY, supra note 22, at 87 (stating that “[w]hen juries sat,
they controlled justice” and according to John Adams, “a jury could determine
the law no matter how a court instructed it”); Matthew P. Harrington, The LawFinding Function of the American Jury, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 377, 377, 386-88
(1999) (noting that until the early 1900’s “lawyers and judges believed that
juries had the power to declare both law and fact”); Marder, supra note 205, at
1264-65 (stating that juries could “find the facts and decide the law”); Young,
supra note 205, at 146 (noting that “juries generally operated as triers of both
law and fact”). See also United States v. Sparf, 156 U.S. 51 (1894) (Gray, J.,
dissenting). Judge Gray believed that the jury had the power to determine the
law.
It is our deep and settled conviction, confirmed by re-examination of
the authorities under the responsibility of taking part in the
consideration and decision of the capital case now before the court, that
the jury, upon the general issue of guilty or not guilty in a criminal
case, have [sic] the right, as well as the power, to decide, according to
their own judgment and consciences, all questions, whether of law or of
fact, involved in that issue.
Id. at 114.
207
3 U.S. 1, 4 (1794). John Jay was one of the principle drafters of the New
York Constitution and was one of New York’s leading political figures.
208
See the discussion of the Forsey case, supra Part.II.C.2; see also
Barkow, supra note 194, at 34, 49, 54. Barkow points out that “the criminal jury
was designed to be a part of our elaborate system of checks and balances,
placing a check on the legislature and executive to ensure that no one received
criminal punishment unless a group of ordinary citizens agreed.” Id.
209
See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the Zenger trial and jury nullification).
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part, from the fact that juries knew as much about the law as most
judges and lawyers.210 Early American lawyers did not receive the
same type of training as their modern counterparts.211 However,
this parity in knowledge started to change as judges and lawyers
received better training and more extensive legal education.212
Although traditional law schools were all but nonexistent in the
nineteenth century, dedicated law schools became a mainstay of
legal training by the early twentieth century.213 As the legal
210

See Harrington, supra note 206, at 378-79 (noting the jury had this
power in part because “few judges in the colonial period had formal legal
training . . . as a result, the judge who presided at trial did not look all the much
different from the jury”); Smith, supra note 12, at 449-50. Smith reasoned that
juries were allowed to determine issues of law in part because of “the perceived
or actual parity in the knowledge of law upon the part of ordinary citizens and
the professional lawyers and judges.” Id.; Young, supra note 205, at 146
(arguing that “because the colonies lacked legally-trained judges, the American
jury was considered on comparable footing with the judiciary when it came to
determination of the applicable law”).
211
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 304-5 (2d ed.
1985) (stating “[t]he American lawyer was never primarily a learned doctor of
laws” and “[l]egal education was not very stringent”).
212
Harrington, supra note 206, at 380 (noting that “[a]s legal education
became more sophisticated, judges became more convinced that the bench was
the proper place in which to lodge the law-finding function”). See also Smith,
supra note 12, at 450-51. Smith points out:
Often, judges themselves had little legal knowledge or possessed
limited access to the law. Thus, authority of juries to pass judgment on
issues of law may have been a peculiar feature of the American system
that was a result of the ignorance of early American legal professionals,
and which, therefore, disappeared as knowledge of law possessed by
legal professionals increased over time relative to that possessed by the
general public.
Id.
213
FRIEDMAN, supra note 211, at 320, 606-7. Friedman tells us that “legal
training at universities was slow to get started, and well into the 19th Century
there were no ‘law schools’ as such at universities.” Id. at 320. For this reason,
“[o]f the lawyers practicing in the United States in 1848, the overwhelming
majority had been trained in a private law office, or had educated themselves by
a course of reading.” Id. at 606. However, the rise of the law school put an end
to that method of learning the law and “by 1900 it was quite clear that the law
school would come to dominate legal education.” Id.
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profession developed, lawyers and judges looked to control an
increasing part of the litigation process.214 Judges became more
knowledgeable about the law and, thus, were better able to instruct
the jury on the relevant legal issues. Furthermore, as the country
developed economically and politically, legal issues became more
intricate and harder for the average layperson to understand.215 The
result was that judges and lawyers no longer believed that juries
could be trusted to decide these complex legal issues.216 The
214

See Harrington, supra note 206, at 422 (stating that “[t]he bench and bar
thus affected a dramatic transformation in the relations between judge and
jury”); Smith, supra note 12, at 445 (arguing that “judges and lawyers would fill
the vacuum left by the erosion in the jury’s power” and that judges and lawyers
“disproportionately influenced the development of legal principles in the United
States”).
215
See Harrington, supra note 206, at 379; Smith, supra note 12, at 445
(stating that “as legal principles (and society in general) grew increasingly
complex, the role of the jury in adjudicating disputes decreased”).
216
See United States v. Sparf, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1894) (stating the jury
should apply the law as instructed by the court). In Sparf, the Court upheld a
lower court’s decision denying the defendants’ request to instruct the jury that it
could find the defendants guilty of manslaughter rather than murder. The Court,
after a lengthy historical discussion about the powers of the jury, concluded:
We must hold firmly to the doctrine that in the courts of the United
States it is the duty of the juries in criminal cases to take the law from
the court, and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from
the evidence. Upon the court rests the responsibility of declaring the
law; upon the jury, the responsibility of applying the law so declared to
the facts as they, upon their consciences, believe them to be.
Id. at 102; Duffy v. The People, 26 N.Y. 588 (1863). In Duffy, the defendant
appealed his robbery conviction on the grounds that his confession was
improperly admitted into evidence and the judge improperly gave the jury
“peremptory instructions upon the legal questions arising on such trials.” Id. at
591. The court affirmed the conviction and ruled that “it is as much the duty of
jurors to be governed by the instructions of the court upon legal questions in
criminal as it is in civil cases.” Id. The court explained its ruling:
1. The selection of jurors from all classes of the people whose
education and business cannot, as a general rule, have qualified them to
decide legal questions, renders it unreasonable as well as apparently
unsafe to require them to pass upon such questions.
2. If jurors were to determine the law, its stability would be subverted,
and it would become as variable as the prejudices, the inclinations and
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development of the American legal profession and the emergence
of the professional judiciary in the 1800s thus proved instrumental
in ending the practice of criminal juries determining both questions
of law and questions of fact.217
The development of modern law and criminal procedure also
has contributed to the reduction of the jury’s power and its role in
the U.S. justice system.218 One example of these changes has been
the emergence of the use of plea bargains in criminal trials.
Although it is difficult to pinpoint exactly when plea bargaining
started to be used in criminal cases, Albert Alschuler and other
legal historians suggest that the practice fully emerged in the late
1800s.219 The increased use of plea bargaining led to a dramatic
the passions of men. Every case would be governed, not by any known
or established rule, but by a rule made for the occasion. Jurors would
become not only judges, but legislators as well.3. All questions in
regard to the admission or rejection of evidence, being questions of
law, are required to be decided by the court. If jurors are to decide law
and fact, their jurisdiction should extend to these questions, which often
control the verdict.
Id. at 591-92 (internal quotations omitted); see also Harrington, supra note 206,
at 379 (“members of the bench and bar gradually came to the conclusion that the
jury’s power over law must be restrained”); Smith, supra note 12, at 450-51
(noting that “there was judicial pressure to curtail the power of the jury”).
217
See Harrington, supra note 206, at 380, 436 (stating “[t]he drive to limit
the [jury’s] law-finding function was entirely a judge-led exercise” and “[t]he
professional judiciary’s desire for symmetry in the criminal law eventually
diminished the jury’s role”); Young, supra note 205, at 146 (observing that “the
role of the jury regarding issues of law began to diminish, due in part, to the
emergence of a better-educated judiciary”).
218
See Marder, supra note 205, at 1266 (“One concomitant of this
enhanced role for both judge and lawyer was a diminished role for the juror.”).
Jury nullification remains one of the only powers exclusively enjoyed by the
jury. Although quite often viewed negatively, jury nullification exemplifies the
true values and historic ideals of the jury system. See Nancy J. King, Juror
Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America, 1796-1996, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2673
(1996); Todd Barnet, New York Considers Jury Nullification: Informing the Jury
of Its Common Law Right to Decide Both Facts and Law, 65 N.Y. ST. B.J. 40
(Nov. 1993).
219
FRIEDMAN, supra note 211,at 576-77 (stating that “[t]he beginnings of
plea bargaining can be clearly traced to this period [post-Civil War]”); Albert
W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5, 19
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increase in the number of guilty pleas received in felony cases.220
As a direct result of the increase in plea bargaining, the number of
jury trials has decreased dramatically.221
The development of rules of evidence further contributed to the
diminution of the jury’s role in the American justice system.
Through the development of evidentiary rules, judges and lawyers
assumed greater control over trials.222 Subsequently, juries have
become increasingly dependent upon judges and lawyers to guide
them in their efforts in resolving litigation.223 Today, judges serve
as gatekeepers for the jury by screening testimony and determining
the type of evidence the jury hears.224 Although legislatures and
some courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have intervened in
instances in which judges have overstepped their authority and
(1979) (concluding that “plea bargaining did not occur with any frequency until
well into the nineteenth century”).
220
Alschuler, supra note 219, at 18. Alschuler cites Raymond Moley’s
study of guilty pleas in New York during the 19th and early 20th centuries,
which found that in 1839 only 15 percent of felony convictions were by guilty
plea, but by 1926 the number had grown to 90 percent. Id.
221
Id. at 33 (pointing out that “[i]n the early 1920’s, the only alternative to
a guilty plea in most states was a jury trial”).
222
See King supra note 84, at 48 (stating judges control the juries “through
the rules of evidence”); Marder, supra note 205, at 1266 (“With the
development of the rules of evidence, both lawyers and judges had larger roles
to play: lawyers assumed responsibility for demonstrating their respective
versions of the truth, and judges exercised control over the lawyers’
presentations and over the verdicts that were supposed to be based on these
presentations.”); Smith, supra note 12, at 445 (“Thus, the judiciary was able to
contain the decisionmaking power of the jury by determining what evidence
could be heard by the jury, as well as by determining what were the issues of
fact within the purview of the jury, as opposed to issues of law, which were
within the province of the judge’s decisionmaking authority.”).
223
Marder, supra note 205, at 1266.
224
King, supra note 84, at 48-49 (“A judge may not be allowed to tell
jurors what to deduce from the evidence they hear, but he can prevent them from
hearing it at all.”). Additionally, with the advancement in forensics and the
increased use of DNA testing and other technology, judges control the testimony
of expert witnesses. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993) (holding “general acceptance” was not a precondition for admissibility of
scientific evidence and that the trial judge is responsible for determining
whether expert testimony is both relevant and reliable).
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intruded upon the powers of the jury, such intervention to protect
the power of the jury is the exception rather then the norm.225

225

See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (limiting judges’
discretionary powers in sentencing). In Apprendi, the defendant was arrested for
firing several shots into a home owned by an African-American family. Id. at
469. Prosecutors charged him with unlawful possession of a firearm, a charge
that carried a maximum sentence of ten years. Id. at 470. A New Jersey hatecrime statute permitted the judge to exceed the statutory maximum sentence if
the judge determined the defendant acted with racial bias. Id. at 468-69.
Therefore, instead of a ten-year sentence, the defendant received twelve years.
Id. at 474. In ruling the statute unconstitutional, the Court held that “any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury.” Id. at 490. See also Unites States v. Booker, No.
04-104, 2005 WL 50108 (holding the federal sentencing guidelines were
unconstitutional because they violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004) (applying Apprendi
and holding the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated
when the trial judge used evidence not presented to the jury to impose a sentence
which exceeded the statutory minimum by more than three years). In Blakely,
the defendant pleaded guilty to kidnapping and admitted facts in his plea that
could bring a maximum sentence of more than four years. Id. at 2534. Instead of
sentencing the defendant to the maximum 53 months, the judge made “a judicial
determination that he [Blakely] had acted with ‘deliberate cruelty” and imposed
a sentence of 90 months, nearly twice the maximum supported under the statute.
Id. The Court applied the rule set forth in Apprendi that “any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 2536
(quotations omitted). In explaining the basis for its ruling, the Court cited “the
need to give intelligible content to the right of jury trial.” Id. at 2539. See also
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (applying Apprendi to invalidate an
Arizona law that allowed the judge to impose the death penalty if the judge
found one of ten aggravating factors because the factors were not submitted to
the jury); People v. Errington, 762 N.Y.S.2d 524 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). In
Errington, an appeals court overturned a judge’s sentence because the judge
“improperly considered crimes of which the defendant was acquitted as a basis
for sentencing.” Id. at 525. See also Katie Cornell Smith, Punker Con Up for a
Big Break, N.Y. POST, Oct. 17, 2003, at 30. Smith’s article covers the Errington
case and reveals that the trial judge imposed the “harsh” sentence because he felt
the jurors “disregarded the law in their effort to show Errington mercy.” Id.
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B. The Civil War Amendments and the Jury

The Founding Fathers structured the federalist system to ensure
that the federal government did not encroach upon states’ rights.226
However, the passage of the Civil War Amendments completely
altered the structural relationship of the constitutional right to a
jury.227 Before the Civil War, Americans viewed the Bill of Rights
as protecting their freedoms from encroachment by the federal
government.228 The Sixth Amendment provided assurance to the
states that the federal government could not interfere with the right

226

See infra Part I.C. (discussing the drafting of the Constitution).
See AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 110. Amar argues
that the Civil War brought about a fundamental change in how juries were
viewed because as a “local body” the jury could no longer be entrusted to
protect individual liberties. Id. at 110.
228
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment did not apply to the states). In explaining the Court’s ruling,
Marshall stated:
The constitution was ordained and established by the people of the
United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the
government of the individual states. Each state established a
constitution for itself, and in that constitution, provided such limitations
and restrictions on the powers of its particular government, as its
judgment dictated. The people of the United States framed such a
government for the United States as they supposed best adapted to their
situation and best calculated to promote their interests. The powers they
conferred on this government were to be exercised by itself; and the
limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and,
we think, necessarily, applicable to the government created by the
instrument. They are limitations of power granted in the instrument
itself; not of distinct governments, framed by different persons and for
different purposes.
227

If these propositions be correct, the fifth amendment must be
understood as restraining the power of the general government, not as
applicable to the states. In their several constitutions, they have
imposed such restrictions on their respective governments, as their own
wisdom suggested; such as they deemed most proper for themselves. It
is a subject on which they judge exclusively, and with which others
interfere no further than they are supposed to have a common interest.
Id. at 247-48. See also infra Part.I.B.
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to a jury trial.229 The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether the Bill of Rights applied to the states in the 1833 case of
Barron v. Baltimore.230
In Barron, the plaintiff had sued the city of Baltimore under the
Fifth Amendment seeking compensation for damage done to his
wharf.231 Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, explained
that the issue of whether the Fifth Amendment limited the states
was “of great importance, but not of much difficulty.”232 Marshall
ruled that the Fifth Amendment “must be understood as restraining
the power of the general government, not as applicable to the
state.”233 The reason for this was because “[t]he constitution was
ordained and established by the people of the United States for
themselves, for their own government, and not for the government
of the individual states.”234 The states had their own constitutions,
which provided limitations on their respective governments.235
After the Civil War, Congress passed the Civil War
Amendments abolishing slavery and granting the former slaves
citizenship and the right to vote.236 However, the Northern
politicians controlling Congress realized abolishing slavery was
only the first step in the process of breaking down the shackles of
slavery.237 Congress also wanted to protect the former slaves and
their newfound freedom from encroachment by the southern states
and believed the Bill of Rights was the key.238 Problematically,
229

See infra Part.I.B.
Barron, 32 U.S. at 247.
231
Id. at 244-45.
232
Id. at 247.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Barron, 32 U.S. at 247 (“Each state established a constitution for itself,
and in that constitution, provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers
of its particular government, as its judgment dictated.”).
236
See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII – XV.
237
CURTIS, supra note 31, at 35. Curtis explains that “Republicans had long
been troubled by the South’s interference with rights guarantied by the Bill of
Rights” and “in the changed political climate of 1866 Republicans were
unwilling to tolerate such deprivations.” Id.
238
Id. at 37-56. The Republicans in Congress saw Reconstruction as an
opportunity to secure liberty and protect “the rights of citizens of the United
230
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however, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Barron, had ruled that the
Bill of Rights did not apply to the states.239 Therefore, in order to
ensure that the situation in the South would not revert back to the
way it was before the Civil War, the Republicans needed to alter
the political dynamic.240 The Republicans needed to make sure that
the principles represented in the Bill of Rights could be enforced
against the states because the states no longer could be trusted to
protect individual liberties.241 Instead, the federal government
needed to intervene to safeguard personal freedoms.242 Congress
thus intended for the Civil War Amendments to provide a means
for the subsequent enforcement of the Bill of Rights with regard to
the states.243
States.” Id. at 54. These politicians believed “the Bill of Rights secured the
rights of citizens and protected these rights against interference from any
quarter.” Id. at 37. In fact, they “interpreted the guaranties of the Bill of Rights
to limit the states as well as the federal government.” Id. at 51.
239
See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
240
CURTIS, supra note 31, at 35.
241
Id. at 41 (The Republicans especially wanted to protect fundamental
liberties “against denial by the states.”).
242
Id. at 55. Senator Richard Yates described the proper role of this “new”
federal government as that of “a central Federal Government which, while it
allows the States the exercise of all their appropriate functions as local State
governments, can hold the States well poised in their appropriate spheres, can
secure the enforcement of the constitutional guarantees of republican
government, the rights and immunities of citizens in the several States, and carry
out all the objects provided for in the preamble of the Constitution.” Id.
243
Arguably, the difficulty in determining the effect of the Civil War
Amendments can be blamed on Justice Miller’s majority opinion in the
Slaughter House Cases. See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). Justice
Miller ruled that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not apply to the States. For this reason the Supreme Court has
struggled with how to apply the Amendments to the Bill of Rights and resulted
in the much-maligned practice of selective incorporation based on “substantive
due process”. For a more complete analysis on the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,162-71 (1968) (Black, J.,
concurring) (discussing the selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights and
arguing that all of the Bill of Rights should be applicable to the States); AMAR,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32; Laurence H. Tribe, Pursuing the Pursuit of
Happiness, N. Y. REVIEW, Sept. 24, 1998, (book review) (reviewing CHARLES L.
BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND
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The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments granted
the former slaves freedom and civil rights.244 Among these civil
rights were the right to vote and the right to serve on a jury.245
Prior to the passage of the Civil War Amendments, only white
property owners could serve on juries.246 Thus, for former slaves,
the right to a jury trial and the right to serve on a jury symbolized
their new status as free citizens of the United States.247
Republicans in Congress believed the Fourteenth Amendment,
through its due process and equal protection provisions, would
guarantee that former slaves enjoyed the right to serve on a jury
and other basic civil liberties that were represented in the
Constitution.248 However, to the southern states and many other
Americans, former slaves serving on juries provided a clear
reminder that states could no longer deny freedmen their political
rights outright.249 In an attempt to curtail these newfound
freedoms, states looked to de-emphasize the political aspect of the
jury.250 States began to view the jury as a means of protecting
individual rights, rather than as a political institution, so they

UNNAMED (1998)).
244
U.S. CONST. amends. XIII – XV.
245
See U.S. CONST. art. III; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
246
Nancy S. Marder, Introduction to the Jury at a Crossroad: The
American Experience, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 921 (2003) (“In the past, jury
service was available only to White men with property.”).
247
Id. (stating “jury duty now takes on added meaning” because it “is a
hard-won badge of citizenship; it is an indicia of belonging and of counting as a
citizen”).
248
CURTIS, supra note 31, at 216-17.
249
AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 271.
250
Id. (“Whereas the Founders emphasized Americans’ rights to participate
in government by serving in juries, Reconstructors at first emphasized the right
to be tried by juries.”) (emphasis added). Amar argues that Congress attempted
to solve this problem by passing a law that barred states from excluding black
people from serving on juries. Id. at 273. By basing this law on the Fifteenth
Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress emphasized the
political rights aspect of the jury. Id. (“[T]he Fifteenth Amendment, rightly read,
affirms blacks’ political rights-to vote, serve on juries, and hold office-just as the
Fourteenth Amendment had affirmed blacks’ civil rights to do virtually
everything but.”). Id.

TULCHIN MACROED FINAL 2-28-05.DOC

472

3/14/2005 2:45 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

would not by law have to include blacks on juries.251 This
emphasis on the civil rights aspect of the jury signaled a gradual
change in the perception of the jury as a political institution.
C. The Supreme Court and the Right to a Jury
Although the American Civil War and the Reconstruction
initiated the evolution of the modern jury, a handful of Supreme
Court decisions in the last fifty years have provided the real
impetus for the changed perception of the jury’s role in society.
The first major change in the constitutional right to a jury trial
occurred in Patton v. United States.252 In Patton, a juror became
sick during the trial and was excused.253 After consulting with the
judge, the prosecution and the defense agreed to continue the trial
with an eleven-person jury.254 The jury ultimately convicted the
defendants and the defendants appealed.255 The defendants claimed
that they did not have “[the] power to waive their constitutional
right to a trial by a jury of twelve persons.”256 The Court disagreed
and ruled that a defendant could waive his constitutional right to a
jury trial in criminal cases.257 The Court interpreted Article III of
the Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to mean “substantially
the same thing.”258 Therefore, the Court determined that the
251

See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304-5 (1880) (ruling that
excluding blacks from serving on the jury violated the black defendant’s civil
rights). Excluding blacks from juries was a common practice in America,
especially in the southern states. See also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965) (holding that the Constitution does not entitle a criminal defendant to
“demand a proportionate number of his race on the jury which tries him” nor
does eliminating blacks from the jury constitute “a denial of equal protection of
the laws”). It was not until 1986 that the Supreme Court ruled a state could not
exclude people from serving on a jury solely on account of their race. See
Baston v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
252
281 U.S. 276 (1930).
253
Id. at 286.
254
Id. at 286-87.
255
Id.
256
Id. at 287.
257
Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930)
258
Id. at 298.
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constitutional right to a jury trial did not establish the jury “as a
part of the frame of government,” but rather as an individual right
that could be waived.259 The Court’s decision in Patton had a
dramatic influence on New York, as evidenced by the fact that
shortly after the ruling was issued, New York amended its
constitution to allow waiver of the right to a jury trial in criminal
cases.260
The Court’s ruling in Duncan v. Louisiana further established
the concept of the jury as an individual right.261 In Duncan, the
defendant had been convicted of battery, a misdemeanor under
Louisiana law.262 Although battery carried a maximum sentence of
two years, the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial under
Louisiana law because Louisiana did not provide for jury trials in
misdemeanor cases.263 The Court ruled that the right to a jury trial
in criminal cases is “fundamental to the American scheme of
justice” and, therefore, falls within the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.264 The Court held that the right to a jury
trial protects defendants “against arbitrary law enforcement” and
that to deny the right in “serious criminal cases” would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.265
The Court reasoned that the right to a jury is “essential for . . .
assuring that fair trials are provided for all defendants.”266 By
applying the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial to the states
259

Id. at 293-95. The Court believed that “it is reasonable to conclude that
the framers of the Constitution simply were intent upon preserving the right of
trial by jury primarily for the protection of the accused.” Id. at 297. The Court
did note that the constitutional right to a trial by jury meant the right to a jury of
twelve people requiring a unanimous verdict. Id. at 288-89 (stating that the
“common law elements [of the right to a jury] are embedded in the
constitutional provisions . . . and are beyond the authority of the legislative
department to destroy or abridge”).
260
See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the changes to the right to a jury trial
in the New York Constitution).
261
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
262
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 146.
263
Id.
264
Id.
265
Id. at 156.
266
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 158.
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through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court focused on the civil
rights aspect of the right to a jury trial. In emphasizing concepts
such as fairness and liberty, the Court discussed the right to a jury
trial in terms of the defendant’s right, rather than the juror’s right.
This characterization reinforces the perception that the right to a
jury trial is an individual rather than a political right and,
problematically, overlooks the significance of the jury as a political
institution.267
Following Duncan, the Court ruled in Williams v. Florida that
the Sixth Amendment did not mandate twelve person juries.268 The
Court dismissed reliance on the number twelve as “a historical
accident.”269 It noted that the proper issue related to “the function
267

Furthermore, by emphasizing fairness and liberty, the Court introduced
an interpretative element into the jury debate, which opened the door to
eventually limiting the right. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)
(upholding a conviction based on an 11-1 jury verdict as it did not violate Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972)
(holding that a conviction based on a 9-3 verdict did not violate defendant’s
Fourteenth Amendment right of due process); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,
86 (1970) (holding that the Constitution does not require twelve person juries).
268
399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970).
269
Id. at 86-89. The Court argued that the framers of the U.S. Constitution
did not intend to preserve the entire common law jury right in the Constitution.
Id. at 92-93. The Court based its reasoning on the fact that a draft of the clause
originally contained common law jury features, but that these requirements were
ultimately taken out of the final version. Id. at 93-97. I have argued in this note
that the reason for the streamlined language in Article III is because the Framers
intended only to preserve the institutional aspect of the right to a jury in that
clause. See infra Part I.C. It is the Sixth Amendment that protects the individual
right to a jury trial and which contains references to jury specifications. I believe
the Founders did not put more specific language in the Sixth Amendment
because they did not want to encroach on what was traditionally a state issue.
The jury was a local institution already established at the state level so including
specifications in the federal constitution would be seen as limiting states’
powers. The right to a jury was universally viewed as a fundamental right of a
free and democratic society so I do not think any of the Framers would have
envisioned that the states would act to limit it as it existed already in their
respective political systems. Regardless of whether or not the Court’s historical
analysis is correct, the New York Constitution incorporated the common law
right to a jury, therefore mandating a jury of twelve and requiring a unanimous
verdict. See infra Part III.B. (discussing the drafting of the New York
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that the particular feature performs and its relation to the purposes
of the jury trial.”270 Thus, because a six-person jury could protect
the defendant against government oppression, a twelve-person jury
was not required under the Sixth Amendment.271
In the Williams decision, the Court refrained from ruling on the
unanimity requirement, but implied that a unanimous verdict may
be required.272 This suggestion proved misleading, as a year later,
in Apodaca v. Oregon and Johnson v. Louisiana, the Court held
that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial did not require a
unanimous verdict.273 In Apodaca, each of the petitioners had been
convicted by less-than-unanimous jury verdicts in accordance with
Oregon’s constitution.274 As in Williams, the Court believed that a
constitutional right to a jury trial).
270
Williams, 399 U.S. at 99-100. Admittedly, the Court does mention the
communitarian nature of the jury and the virtue of deliberations. Id. at 100.
However, the reference to the communitarian aspect was made in terms of the
fair cross-section representation requirement, another aspect of the individual
liberty function of the jury. Furthermore, it seems contrary to Tocqueville’s
democratic institution to emphasize the importance of deliberation, but permit a
reduction in the size of the jury.
271
Id. at 100-2. Having dismissed the twelve person jury requirement as
“an historical accident”, the Court seems to have replaced it with the equally
arbitrary number of six. Why draw the line there? Why not a five person jury?
The Court in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245 (1977), considered that
scenario and ruled that trying a defendant with a five-person jury violated the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. For a criticism of the Ballew and Williams
ruling, see Daniel P. Collins, Making Juries Better Factfinders, 20 HARV. J. L. &
PUBL. POL’Y 489 (1997).
272
Williams, 399 U.S. at 101 n.46. The Court explained:
We intimate no view whether or not the requirement of unanimity is an
indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment jury trial. While much
of the above historical discussion applies as well to the unanimity as to
the 12-man requirement, the former, unlike the latter, may well serve
an important role in the jury function, for example, as a device for
insuring that the Government bear the heavier burden of proof.
Id.
273
406 U.S. 404 (1972) (upholding a conviction based on an 11-1 jury
verdict as it did not violate Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial); 406 U.S. 356
(1972) (holding that a conviction based on a 9-3 verdict did not violate
defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right of due process).
274
Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406.
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non-unanimous jury could adequately protect a defendant’s rights.
The Court rejected the argument that allowing non-unanimous jury
verdicts would disenfranchise “minority elements within the
community.”275 In an opinion reminiscent of its decisions in Patton
and Duncan, the Court in Apodaca and Johnson discussed the right
to a jury trial with regard to its effects on an individual’s civil
rights. By focusing on the jury’s role in protecting individual
liberties, the Court further contributed to the perception of the right
to a jury trial as solely an individual right.
Ironically, the decisions in Johnson and Apodaca upholding the
constitutionality of non-unanimous jury verdicts bring the right to
a jury trial back full circle to the Civil War Amendments. The
Radical Republicans wanted to apply the principles espoused in the
Bill of Rights to the states, but could not do so directly because of
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Barron.276 Therefore, they enacted
the Civil War Amendments and intended for these new
amendments to protect individual liberties from encroachment by
the states.277 Nearly one hundred years later, in 1968, the Supreme
Court used the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for ruling that the
Sixth Amendment applies to the states.278
Unfortunately, the Court’s emphasis of the individual liberty
protection role of the jury detracts from the understanding of the
jury as a political institution and ignores the jury’s rich heritage as
a political institution that sits at the center of our federalist system.
Furthermore, the Court’s interpretation of this right differs from
the common law right incorporated in New York’s Constitution.279
It also differs from the jury that existed in early America. In part
275

Id. at 413. The Court did not think any group was entitled to block a
conviction, only participate in the legal process.
276
See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment did not apply to the states).
277
See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 181-215; CURTIS, supra
note 31, at 57-91, 131-53.
278
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding the Sixth
Amendment applies to the states).
279
As discussed previously, the New York Constitution incorporated the
common law right to a jury trial which means the right to a twelve person jury
and a unanimous verdict. See infra Part.III.
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because of the Court’s decisions, the jury is no longer viewed as a
sacred political institution warranting constitutional or
governmental protection. Instead, the concept of the jury as a
political body is subjugated to and replaced by its other role—that
of a protector of individual rights. Moreover, except in capital
cases, the Court’s decisions enable states to restrict the right to a
jury trial as it existed in colonial times and in common law.280
Despite the diminution of the jury’s role in the judicial process
generally, juries still wield significant influence on capital
sentencing and may, in that context, serve in their traditional role
as both a defender of individual liberties and a political body.281
Why distinguish capital cases from other criminal cases? Because
death represents the ultimate deprivation of liberty and the state
should protect its citizens from any attempts to deprive them of
life, liberty or the pursuit of happiness.282 For this reason, previous
efforts to eliminate the unanimity requirement in New York have
provided an exception for death penalty cases. Similarly, the New
York Constitution’s waiver provision, which permits defendants to
waive their right to a jury trial, includes an exception for death
penalty cases.283 Indeed, even the Williams Court seemed to
280

See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (no unanimity
requirement in the Constitution); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (jury
may be less than twelve persons); Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276 (1930) (right to a
jury may be waived).
281
For a discussion on the role of juries in capital cases see Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (invalidating trial judge’s imposition of the death
penalty as the judge factored in evidence that was not submitted to the jury). See
also Joseph L. Hoffmann et al., Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of Death, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2001).
282
See People ex rel. Rohrlich v. Follette, 20 N.Y.2d 297, 300 (1967)
(discussing the waiver of the right to a jury trial and because the right “was so
fundamental and so essential to the protection of the defendant’s rights” it could
not be waived in capital cases).
283
See N.Y. Leg. Documents no. 114 at p. 30-31 (1931) (proposing that
“[a]n amendment should be made empowering the Legislature, by general law,
to provide that verdicts in cases tried by juries may be rendered by five-sixths of
the jurors constituting the jury in any civil or criminal action except where the
crime charges is or may be punishable by death”) (emphasis added); N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 2 (providing that the right to a jury trial “may be waived by the
defendant in all criminal cases, except for those in which the crime charged may
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recognize the fundamental difference between a capital case and
other cases with regard to the right to a jury.284
A lot has changed in the United States since Jefferson and the
other Framers gathered in Philadelphia to draft a constitution that
would serve as a blueprint for the formation of a new government.
One of these changes has been the marginalization of the jury’s
role in our federal system of government. Several different factors
contributed to this change in the jury’s substantive powers.
Unfortunately, these factors also affected the right to a jury trial at
the state level.
V. THE EROSION OF THE RIGHT TO A JURY IN NEW YORK
The Zenger case, the Forsey case, and the trial of Nicholas
Bayard demonstrate the profound influence juries had on New
York’s colonial criminal and political systems.285 However, the
right to a jury trial in New York was not impervious to the changes
occurring at the federal level and in other states. Like juries in
other states, the New York jury experienced an erosion of its
substantive powers.286 Despite this erosion and the limited
understanding of the jury’s role advocated by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Williams and Apodaca, New York has resisted making
be punishable by death”) (emphasis added).
284
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970) (stating the fact that “no
State provides for less than 12 jurors [in capital cases] . . . suggests implicit
recognition of the value of the larger body as a means of legitimating society’s
decision to impose the death penalty.”).
285
See ALEXANDER, supra note 40 (providing a detailed account of the
Zenger trial and the practice of jury nullification in colonial times); Johnson,
supra note 101, at 61 (discussing Forsey v. Cunningham and the struggle
between the colonial government, the legislature, and the court over the sanctity
of a jury’s verdict); LEVY, supra note 22, at 77 (describing the trials of Nicholas
Bayard and John Hutchins and the importance of the vicinage requirement).
These cases also demonstrate the fierce independence and political spirit of the
jury that critics today find so troubling. Cf. PIZZI, supra note 201, at 200-20
(arguing that the jury system needs to be modified and “jury nullification makes
a mockery of” the justice system).
286
See Duffy v. The People, 26 N.Y. 588 (1863) (rejecting the view that
juries have the power to decide questions of law).
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drastic changes to its constitutional protection of the right to a jury
trial in criminal cases. One major exception to this consistent
protection of the right was the addition of the waiver provision to
the New York Constitution in 1938. A more recent threat to the
consistent protection of the right to a jury trial is the movement to
eliminate the unanimity requirement in the New York
Constitution.287
A. The Waiver of the Right to Trial by Jury
The drafters of the New York Constitution believed the right to
a jury trial was a fundamental right and sought to protect it in the
state’s first constitution.288 For this reason, New York’s
constitution protects the right to a jury trial in all felony criminal
cases.289 However, in 1938, New York amended the Constitution
to allow citizens to waive this right.290 This proved extremely
controversial because many believed that the right to a jury was so
inherently fundamental that it could not be waived.291 In fact, prior
287

See supra note 1.
See infra Part III; See also People v. Cosmos, 205 N.Y. 91, 95 (1912)
(pointing to the constitutional protection of the right as evidence of its
importance).
289
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (McKinney’s 2004).
290
New York included several constitutional safeguards with this waiver.
See infra Part III.C.2 (requiring a written waiver to be personally executed by
the defendant in open court in front of a judge and judicial approval). The
Constitution also provides for an important exception to the waiver provision,
which prevents a defendant from waiving the right to a jury trial in capital cases.
See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (McKinney’s 2004) (providing that “[a] jury trial
may be waived by the defendant in all criminal cases, except those in which the
crime charged may be punishable by death.”).
291
See People v. Page, 88 N.Y.2d 1, 5-7 (1996) (discussing the controversy
surrounding the waiver and stating that people considered the right “absolute
and [one that] could never be waived by either party”); People ex rel. Rohrlich
v. Follette, 20 N.Y.2d 297 (1967) (explaining that prior to the waiver provision
it was thought that “the right to a trial by jury was so fundamental and so
essential to the protection of the defendant’s rights that it could not be waived”);
People v. Cosmos, 205 N.Y. 91, 97 (1912). “Thus we see that the right of trial
by jury, both in England and here, is imbedded in the Constitution; and with us
it is a right which, in criminal cases cannot be waived.” Id. at 97.
288
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to the amendment, courts in New York had prohibited defendants
from waiving the right to a jury trial.
In People v. Cancemi, the New York Court of Appeals
overturned the defendant’s conviction and ordered a new trial
because it determined that the defendant had improperly waived
his right to a jury trial.292 In Cancemi, a juror became sick during
the trial and the defendant agreed to let the trial continue even
though there were only eleven jurors.293 The court ruled that
allowing a defendant to waive the right to a jury trial “would be a
highly dangerous innovation.”294 Furthermore, based on of the
history of the right and “the constitution and laws establishing and
securing [it],” the court determined that “any number short of a full
panel of twelve jurors” would not be tolerated.295
The court based its ruling on the fact that there is a
fundamental difference between civil and criminal trials.296
Providing for a waiver in civil trials does not raise the troubling
issues involved with criminal cases because in a civil trial both
parties represent their own interests.297 As Judge Strong wrote,
“[c]ivil suits relate to . . . only individual rights which are within
their individual control, and which they may part with at their
292

18 N.Y. 128 (1858).
Id. at 134-35.
294
Id. at 138.
295
Id.
296
Id. at 135-39.
297
See People v. Cancemi, 18 N.Y. 128, 135-36 (1858). The court, in
discussing the waiver of the right to a jury trial and the distinction between
criminal and civil trials, stated:
There is, obviously, a wide and important distinction between civil
suits and criminal prosecutions, as to the legal right of a defendant to
waive a strict substantial adherence to the established constitutional,
statutory, and common-law mode and rules of judicial proceedings.
This distinction arises from the great difference in the nature of such
cases, in respect to the interests involved and the objects to be
accomplished.
Id. This different treatment of the jury based on the whether the case is criminal
or civil continues today. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (McKinney’s 2004) (“The
legislature may provide, however, by law, that a verdict may be rendered by not
less than five-sixths of the jury in any civil case.”).
293
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pleasure.”298 Therefore, because of this difference, the court ruled
that “the right of a defendant in a criminal prosecution to affect, by
consent, the conduct of the case, should be much more limited than
in civil actions.”299
More than fifty years later, the Court of Appeals, in People v.
Cosmos, reiterated that the right to a jury trial could not be
waived.300 In Cosmos, the defendant was convicted of first-degree
murder after a jury trial and filed a motion asking the court to set
aside the verdict.301 The trial court denied the motion and the
defendant appealed.302 The defendant argued that the verdict
should be set aside because one of the jurors lacked the statutory
property qualifications required for jury service.303 The court
affirmed the lower court’s decision because the issue did not
“affect the merits” of the case.304 The court also determined that
the defendant should have raised the issue during his trial.305 In
reaching this decision, the court discussed the “sacredness and
importance of the right to trial by jury” and concluded that the
right could not be waived.306
The adoption of the waiver provision signaled a fundamental
shift in the perception of the jury and its role in New York’s
judicial system. The citizens of New York were sufficiently
concerned about this shift that they added another amendment
shortly after the waiver provision that imposed several restrictions
on the waiver.307 Regardless, the waiver amendment proved to be a
298

Id. at 136.
Cancemi, 18 N.Y. at 137.
300
205 N.Y. 91 (1912)
301
Cosmos, 205 N.Y. at 93.
302
Id.
303
Id.
304
Id.
305
Id. at 104.
306
Id. at 95-96. The court stated that “the citizen is not only entitled to the
trial by jury . . . but that in criminal cases in which it has been heretofore used it
cannot be waived by either party [government or defendant].” Id. at 96. The
court later reiterated this point: “Thus we see that the right of trial by jury, both
in England and here, is imbedded in the Constitution; and with us it is a right
which, in criminal cases, cannot be waived.” Id. at 97 (emphasis added).
307
See People v. Page, 88 N.Y.2d 1, 5-6 (1996) (stating that the
299
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significant change to the right to a jury trial in New York. The
availability of the waiver suggested that justice could be
administered without a jury. Furthermore, by allowing defendants
to waive the right, the amendment diminished not only the jury’s
ability to protect individual liberties, but also the jury’s role as a
political institution.
B. The Proposed Amendment
Although the passage of the waiver amendment proved to be a
major change to the right to a jury trial in New York, New Yorkers
still enjoyed the full protections of the common law right as it
existed under the first constitution.308 This meant that New Yorkers
had the right to be tried by a twelve-person jury and the right to a
unanimous verdict. However, some New Yorkers worried that the
passage of the waiver provision would lead to other changes to the
right.309 Recently, several representatives in the New York
Assembly suggested that New York should amend the New York
Constitution to eliminate the unanimity requirement for juries in
criminal trials.310 In 2003, New York State Assemblyman Tom
amendment was needed because it helped to ensure the defendant had
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial).
308
That is the right to a twelve person jury and a unanimous verdict. See
infra Part III.
309
See People v. Page, 88 N.Y.2d 1, 5 (1996) (citing 2d Ann. Report of
N.Y. Jud. Council, 1936 N.Y. Legis. Doc. No. 48, at 100). “Members of the
former Judicial Council even questioned whether the proposed constitutional
amendment providing for waiver of jury trial by a criminal defendant would
suffice to legalize trial by jury of less than twelve men, as well as a complete
waiver of the jury.” Id. (internal quotations omitted); People v. Cancemi, 18
N.Y. 128, 138 (1858). “If a deficiency of one juror might be waived, there
appears to be no good reason why a deficiency of eleven might not be; and it is
difficult to say why, upon the same principle, the entire panel might not be
dispensed with, and the trial committed to the court alone.” Id.; People v.
Sanabria, 249 N.Y.S.2d 66, 69-70 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964) (discussing the 1931
New York legislature’s debate over a proposal to eliminate the unanimity
requirement).
310
See Assemb. 4469, 226th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003). This was not the first
time such an idea has been proposed. A similar amendment was introduced in
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2001. See MEMORANDUM, supra note 2.
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Kirwan, along with Assemblypersons David Townsend, Jr., Joel
Miller, and Sandra Lee Wirth, proposed altering the “longstanding” right to a jury provision in the New York Constitution.311
They introduced bill A04469, which provided for the amendment
of the New York Constitution to allow for “a less than unanimous
verdict in misdemeanor and felony prosecutions.”312 Under the
proposed amendment, the New York Constitution would allow for
a “five-sixths jury verdict in a misdemeanor case and a threefourths jury verdict in a felony case.”313
The proponents of the amendment characterize the bill as an
anti-crime initiative.314 They argue that the unanimity requirement
has resulted in a “higher crime rate” and has fomented “disrespect
for the law.”315 Advocates of the amendment maintain that
changing the constitution and eliminating the unanimity
requirement would lead to “more convictions” and, therefore,
would help to “put more criminals behind bars.”316 To further
support their argument, the sponsors of the bill point out that the
federal Constitution “does not require a unanimous jury verdict in
criminal cases.”317 Thus, they argue, New York does not have to
guarantee that right.
VI. A CRITICISM OF THE PROPOSAL TO ALTER THE RIGHT TO A JURY
IN THE NEW YORK CONSTITUTION
The jury’s role in American society represents the fundamental
values upon which this country was founded: democratic selfgovernment and liberty.318 The Framers considered the jury an
311

Assemb. 4469, 226th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003); see also MEMORANDUM,
supra note 2.
312
MEMORANDUM, supra note 2.
313
Id.
314
Id.
315
Id.
316
Id.
317
Id. See also Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (holding that there
is no constitutional right to a unanimous verdict).
318
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 442 (describing the jury “as the
only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to
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important part of both our political and judicial systems.319 They
viewed the jury as an independent political institution that would
act to ensure that politicians and judges followed the law.320
Furthermore, the Founding Fathers believed the right to a jury trial
served to protect citizens from government coercion and
oppression.321 The right also ensured that a defendant would be
judged by his peers and would receive the benefits of our judicial
system.322 Indeed, the very structure of the U.S. Constitution
reflects the jury’s central place in our federalist system and its dual
role as both a political institution offering citizens an opportunity
to govern and to learn about the laws of this country, and a
protector of individual liberties.323
In light of the jury’s position at the center of our federalist
system, it would seem that changing the right would alter the
careful balance of the federalist structure. Furthermore, the
elimination of the unanimity requirement would interfere with the
jury’s ability to function as both an independent political
the principles of its constitution”).
319
Article III of the U.S. Constitution refers to trials of “all crimes,”
implying that the jury forms an integral and required part of the judicial system.
AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 105 (stating that “[t]he words in the
Article III jury clause were plainly understood during the ratification period as
words of obligation”).
320
See Letters from the Federal Farmer (Jan. 18, 1788), supra note 206, at
320. The Federal Farmer believed the jury, as representative of the people,
should uphold the law against wrongful politicians and judges. “If the conduct
of judges shall be severe and arbitrary, and tend to subvert the laws, and change
the forms of government, the jury may check them, by deciding against their
opinions and determinations, in similar cases.” Id.
321
See infra Part I; See also Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2539
(2004). “Just as suffrage ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative
and executive braches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the
judiciary.” Id. at 2539; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (stating
that the jury protects the defendant against an abusive government); Barkow,
supra note 194 (discussing the jury’s role in our constitutional framework).
322
In fact, Article I, Section 1 of the New York Constitution states that
“[n]o member of this state shall be . . . deprived of any of the rights or privileges
secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of
his or her peers.” N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 1 (McKinney’s 2004) (emphasis added).
323
See infra Part.I.B.
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institution and a protector of individual rights. In addition, the
proposed changes would discount the significance of the history of
the right to a jury trial in New York.
1. The Jury as a Symbol of Federalism
As support for their argument for eliminating the unanimity
requirement in the New York Constitution, sponsors of the
proposed amendment point out that the federal Constitution “does
not require a unanimous jury verdict in criminal cases.”324
However, comparing New York’s constitutional protection of the
right to a jury trial to that of the federal Constitution completely
disregards the fundamental characteristics of the jury and ignores
the underlying basis for our federalist system.325
At its core, the jury is a local institution whose judgment
represents the judgment of the community.326 Given its local
character, the right to a jury trial should reflect the customs, values,
and history of the local community.327 In fact, the U.S. Supreme
324

MEMORANDUM, supra note 2. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404 (1972) (holding that there is no constitutional right to a unanimous verdict).
325
See infra Part I.B (discussing the federalists’ concerns over a strong
federal government). Even if the jury no longer serves a significant political
function, it still represents a fundamental right of individual liberty. The antifederalists believed that the states were better equipped to protect individual
liberties than the federal government. Therefore, it does not follow that states are
fulfilling their mandate to protect individual rights if they provide less
protections to the right to a jury than federal courts provide.
326
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (requiring that members of the jury come
from “the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed”). See
also Barkow, supra note 194, at 77 (arguing that “[t]he jury adds a unique
perspective to the criminal justice system: the views of the community”); Smith,
supra note 12, at 472. Interestingly enough, Smith argues that it is the
communitarian aspect of the jury that makes it a source of protection from
abuses of government. Id. at 473.
327
See People v. Dunn, 157 N.Y. 528, 536 (1899). In Dunn, the New York
Court of Appeals upheld a law providing for special juries in certain criminal
cases. Judge Gray, writing for a unanimous court, provided a brief history of the
right to a jury trial and the origin of the right to a jury of one’s peers:
The system of trial by jury, as it grew up at common law, had its root in
the endeavor to secure to a defendant a trial of his cause by a fairly
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Court, in Taylor v. Louisiana, remarked that “[c]ommunity
participation in the administration of the criminal law . . . is . . .
consistent with our democratic heritage.”328 In Taylor, the Court
struck down a provision in the Louisiana Constitution that operated
to exclude women from serving on a jury as a violation of the
Sixth Amendment.329 The Court ruled that having a jury that
represented a “fair-cross-section” of the community was a
fundamental right because it ensured that the whole community
would participate in the judicial process.330
The desire to preserve this local and communitarian aspect of
the jury influenced the drafting of the Constitution.331 This was the
reason the right to a jury trial appears in both Article III and the
Bill of Rights.332 However, even though the right to a jury trial
appears in different parts of the Constitution,333 the actual
protection of the common law right is fairly limited.334
Considering, therefore, that both the United States’ political and
judicial systems are based on a federalist model, it makes sense
that New York’s constitutional right to a jury trial affords greater
selected body of his equals, rather than by his rulers, or by magistrates,
or by persons designated by them, and usage finally obtained of taking
twelve jurymen from the vicinage to judge upon the facts developed by
the evidence of witnesses. The right was conceded to the citizen of
having the judgment of an impartial committee, or body, of his fellowcitizens, upon charges involving his life, or his liberty, or his
property . . . .
Id.
328

419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530.
330
Id.
331
In order to mollify anti-federalists’ concern that the federal government
would encroach upon the states, the framers developed the federalist system of
government and incorporated the right to a jury trial into the Constitution. See
infra Part I.C (discussing the framing of the Constitution).
332
Id.
333
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amends. VI-VII.
334
See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (no unanimity
requirement in the Constitution); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (jury
may be less than twelve persons); Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276 (1930) (right to a
jury may be waived).
329

TULCHIN MACROED FINAL 2-28-05.DOC

3/14/2005 2:45 PM

THE RIGHT TO A JURY IN NEW YORK

487

protection of individual liberties than the federal right.
The maintenance of a right to a jury trial in New York that is
more protective than its federal counterpart is also counseled by
the state’s history. The unanimity requirement has existed as a
principal component of the right in New York since colonial times.
By changing New York’s constitutional protection of the right to
better align it with the federal right, the state would forsake its
political heritage and turn its back on more than three hundred
years of history. In addition, eliminating the unanimity requirement
ignores the underlying reasons for the historical development of
the right in New York.
Some critics argue that states and courts should not be slaves to
history.335 However, New York based its constitutional protection
of the right to a jury trial on the laws and customs that had
developed during colonial times.336 The Founding Fathers
recognized that the states had developed their own political
systems, so they established a federalist system of government that
allowed the colonies to incorporate many of their existing laws and
customs into the new system of government.337 As a result, New
York’s constitutional right to a jury differs from the federal right
because it was founded upon the common law requirements of
unanimity.338 Therefore, the basis for New York’s right to a jury
trial is fundamentally and structurally different from that of the
federal right. Consequently, the alteration of the right would
destroy the unique characteristics of New York’s right to a jury.
2. Protecting the Jury’s Role As a Political Institution
Although the jury’s substantive powers have declined in
modern times, the jury still has the potential to serve as both a
335

See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (holding that there is no
constitutional right to a jury of twelve because “that particular feature of the jury
system appears to have been a historical accident”).
336
See infra Part III (discussing the drafting of the first New York
constitution).
337
See infra Part III.B (discussing incorporating the right to a jury trial as it
existed during colonial times in the first New York constitution).
338
See Id.
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protector of individual rights and a political institution in our
society. Alexis de Tocqueville viewed the American jury system as
providing a means for people to participate in government.339 He
referred to the jury as “the most energetic means of making the
people rule.”340 In this regard, early American juries played an
active role in governance by administering and adjudicating the
laws of the community.341 The jury served a fundamental and
integral part of our political system analogous to the militia342 or a
governmental administrative body.343 Indeed, the American
political and judicial systems are not complete without the jury.344
339

TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 35, at 127. Serving on a jury “invests each
citizen with a kind of magistracy; it makes them all feel the duties which they
are bound to discharge towards society, and the part which they take in its
government.” Id.
340
Id. at 128.
341
Id. at 127. See also Amar, supra note 12, at 1174 (arguing juries involve
people in the administration of justice and they represent “democratic selfgovernment.”); George C. Harris, The Communitarian Function of the Criminal
Jury Trial and The Rights of the Accused, 74 Neb. L. Rev. 804, 806-10 (1995).
342
See e.g., AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 84; Amar,
Reinventing Juries, supra note 12, at 1170. Amar argues that the jury and the
militia are “cousins” in that they both were local in nature, born of the right of
citizenship and represented checks on an overreaching government. Id.
343
See Richard A. Primus, When Democracy Is Not Self-Government:
Toward a Defense of the Unanimity Rule for Criminal Juries, 18 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1417, 1422-23 (1997). Primus argues that juries aren’t self-governing
institutions like “legislatures or town meetings.” Instead, he argues that juries
function more like an administrative agency that performs “other-government”
functions. He bases this belief on the fact that juries do not decide issues
affecting their own interests and are not bound by their decisions. Id. Although I
ultimately agree with Primus’ conclusions, I disagree with his characterization
of the jury. I believe that juries are an integral part of the process and play an
active role in adjudicating cases. Furthermore, I think serving on a jury has a
direct impact on a person’s life and that juries are bound by their decisions. To
argue that the impact of their decision is disproportionate with the impact on the
defendant and therefore less tangible ignores the overall significance of the
jury’s role in the judicial process. I think the relationship between the jury, the
defendant, and the adjudication process represents the fundamental nature of the
jury and explains why it is such a sacred institution.
344
See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2538 (2004) (noting the
right to a jury trial more than a procedural formality, “but a fundamental
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New York’s history, in particular, demonstrates how citizens,
through the practice of the right to a jury trial, played a large role
in both the political and adjudicative processes.345 In this capacity,
the jury functions as a political institution and, for this reason,
serving on a jury should be considered a valued political right.346
Ironically, by advocating the elimination of the unanimity
requirement, many critics emphasize the democratic nature of the
jury.347 They believe allowing non-unanimous rule would conform
reservation of power in our constitutional structure”).
345
See infra Part II.C (citing examples of the New York colonial jury in
action). Zenger showed how the jury could protect an individual defendant from
an overzealous prosecutor and how the jury can act as a political institution and
nullify laws it considers unjust. The Forsey case demonstrates the role the jury
played in the emerging political struggle and debate in New York and it
reinforces the importance and weight given to jury verdicts by members of the
judiciary and the legislature. See Letters of Centinel (Oct. 1787–Apr. 1788),
reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 149 (Herbert J. Storing ed.,
1981). The Centinel, an anti-federalist, cited Governor Colden’s actions in the
Forsey case as a reason the Constitution needed stronger protections for the right
to a jury. Id. Furthermore, the case proves that citizens, especially politicians,
believed the jury to be an integral part of the judicial process. The trial of
Nicholas Bayard and John Hutchins shows the value citizens placed on the right
to a trial by a jury of their peers. The defendants in that case believed their right
to a jury trial had been violated because the jury was not composed of their
peers. This case also demonstrates the independence of the jury as it refused to
disclose its deliberations or to discuss its verdict.
346
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 106 (stating that a “jury
trial was not simply and always an individual right but also an institution of
localism and popular sovereignty”). In his concurring opinion in Duncan v.
Louisiana, Justice Fortas argued that a “[j]ury trial is more than a principle of
justice applicable to individual cases. It is a system of administration of the
business of the State.” 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring). See
also People v. Irizarry, 536 N.Y.S.2d 630, 635 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (pointing
out that the Committee of the Constitutional Convention of 1938 “expressed the
view that the jury was a significant political institution”). It is important to note
that the requirements for serving on the jury have changed significantly in the
last two centuries to the point where now most citizens may serve on a jury. This
change helps to understand why much of our society no longer considers the
political aspect of the jury nor sees it as a political institution.
347
See Jason L. Riley, Rule of Law: Should a Jury Verdict Be Unanimous?,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1995, at A11. In his article Riley quotes Professor Warren
Schwartz, an advocate of abolishing the unanimity requirement. Schwartz says,

TULCHIN MACROED FINAL 2-28-05.DOC

490

3/14/2005 2:45 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

with the democratic principles of our society.348 However,
eliminating the unanimity requirement and amending the
constitution to allow for a conviction by a 9-3 verdict would
effectively diminish the jury’s ability to function as a democratic
institution. This becomes increasingly evident when one considers
the functions of the jury in the judicial system.
A criminal jury is more than a finder of fact; it is a microcosm
of democratic government.349 Early Americans believed serving on
a criminal jury represented not only a civic duty, but also a civic
right similar to voting.350 In order to convict the accused of a
felony, the government must convince twelve individuals, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime. To
reach a verdict, jurors must deliberate and vote. The deliberation
process and voting are both foundations of a democratic society.351
The elimination of the unanimity requirement would detract
from this deliberation process.352 This is because requiring a
majority verdict instead of a unanimous one would reduce the need
“[I]f one conceives of jury decision-making as a fundamentally democratic
enterprise . . . it makes sense to inquire as to whether the rule employed in all
other democratic institutions might be appropriate for this one.” Id. See also
Amar, supra note 12, at 1189-90 (arguing that “most of our analogies tug toward
majority rule—legislatures generally use it; voters abide by it”).
348
Riley, supra note 347.
349
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Fortas, J.,
concurring) (stating that the jury administers the business of the state).
350
Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, supra note 35, at 684 (citing
Vikram D. Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 203 (1995)). This view arises not only out of the functional
aspect of the jury, but also the procedural responsibilities as well.
351
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 274 (pointing out that
voting is central to what jurors do and that “in America, ordinary voters had
always served as jurors”). Amar illustrates these core values of the jury system
by discussing the significance importance of the Fifteenth Amendment and its
impact on former slaves. Id. (stating “the Fifteenth Amendment helped restore
much of the original political vision underlying juries that the Fourteenth
Amendment had warped”).
352
See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1272-73 (2000) (pointing out that studies have shown
implementing majority rule “appears to alter both the quality of the deliberative
process and the accuracy of the jury’s judgment”); Osher, supra note 7, at 1361.
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for juries to reach a consensus.353 A recent study undertaken by the
National Center for State Courts (NCSC) reported that nearly
“twenty percent of jurors” do not “begin to form an opinion about
the evidence until jury deliberations had commenced” and that
nearly 25 percent of jurors change their minds during
deliberations.354 Studies have also shown that once a jury discovers
it has a reached a majority, deliberations come to an end.355 This
aborted deliberation process indicates that allowing for a majority
verdict prevents juries from engaging in thorough consideration of
the evidence and legal issues presented at trial.356 In turn,
eliminating the unanimity requirement potentially threatens the
accuracy of the verdicts rendered by juries.357
Majority verdicts in jury trials also prove problematic in that
they dilute the voting power of the minority. Providing defendants
with the right to a unanimous verdict by a jury of their peers
legitimizes the judicial process and increases the public’s faith in
the judicial system.358 Furthermore, serving on a jury allows the
community to be involved in the political and judicial system.
Allowing for a three-fourths majority verdict in criminal cases,
however, stifles debate and renders some juror’s votes
meaningless.359 In addition, studies have also shown that jurors in
trials requiring a majority verdict do not listen to or respect each

353

See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 352, at 1272-73; Osher, supra note 7,
at 1361-62.
354
PAULA L. HANNAFORD ET AL., NAT’L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
Executive Summary to ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM? 5 (2002), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_Juries_HungJuriesExecSumPu
b.pdf. See also HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 4, at 63-67.
355
Osher, supra note 7, at 1361.
356
Id.; see also Taylor-Thompson, supra note 352, at 1272-73.
357
Primus, supra note 343, at 1432 (pointing out that requiring a
unanimous verdict “minimizes the potential for incorrect verdicts” because
“[t]welve jurors are less likely to be mistaken than ten or nine or seven”).
358
See Letters from the Federal Farmer (Jan. 18, 1788), supra note 206, at
320 (arguing that “the jury trial brings with it an open and public discussion of
all causes, and excludes secret and arbitrary proceedings”). Id.
359
See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 352, at 1272-74; Osher, supra note 7,
at 1361-62.
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other’s views as much as in cases requiring unanimous verdicts.360
This is a particularly serious issue when the votes that are diluted
belong to African-American jurors or other people of color who
are serving on the jury.361 By reducing the fairness aspect of the
right to a jury trial362 the elimination of the unanimity requirement
would curtail New Yorkers’ political rights and greatly diminish
the jury’s ability to act as a political institution.
3. Preserving the Jury’s Power to Protect Individual Liberties
Of course, the right to a jury trial also serves as a safeguard of
individual liberties.363 Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to Thomas
Paine, described the right as “the only anchor ever yet imagined by
man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its
constitution.”364 Similarly, the Court in Duncan v. Louisiana
viewed the jury as “an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or
eccentric judge.”365 In this manner, the American jury system
places the jury in a position to intervene against the government to
protect a defendant’s liberty.366
360

HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 4, at 14; Taylor-Thompson, supra note
352, at 1273.
361
Taylor-Thompson, supra note 352, at 1276-79 (discussing the effect of
majority rule on people of color and women).
362
See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 398-99 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the unanimity and fair-cross section requirements
complement each other).
363
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2539 (stating a “jury trial is meant to ensure their
[the people’s] control in the judiciary”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155
(1968) (holding the right to a jury trial is a fundamental right within the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
364
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 442.
365
391 U.S. 145 (1968) at 156.
366
See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 399 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart
points out that the unanimity requirement “preserves the jury’s function in
linking law with contemporary society. It provides the simple and effective
method endorsed by centuries of experience and history to combat the injuries to
the fair administration of justice that can be inflicted by community passion and
prejudice.” Id. See also Part III.C.1 infra (discussing the jury nullification in the
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In a criminal case, the defendant’s liberty is at stake; therefore,
the defendant should be provided with all of the protections our
judicial system has to offer. Unfortunately, under the proposed
amendment, it would be easier to reach a verdict in criminal cases
than in civil or even misdemeanor cases.367 The elimination of the
unanimity requirement in a criminal case is, in itself, troubling, but
the requirement of a lower majority in criminal cases than in civil
cases is not only corrosive of justice, but also counterintuitive.368
Indeed, such a rule ignores the fundamentally different dynamics
of civil and criminal cases.369
Currently, forty-eight out of fifty states require unanimous
verdicts in criminal felony cases.370 It is surprising that two states
do not provide for unanimous verdicts, given that requiring
unanimity is the surest way to safeguard a defendant’s liberty.
With a unanimous verdict, in order to get a conviction, the
government must convince twelve individuals beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime. This helps to
reinforce the fairness of the verdict and ensures that the verdict
truly represents the judgment of the community. For these reasons,
New York should reject the proposed amendment, as its adoption
would undermine one of the fundamental purposes of the jury
system and hinder the jury’s ability to protect individual liberties.
Supporters of the proposed amendment to the New York
Constitution argue that eliminating the unanimity requirement
would “produce more convictions and put more criminals behind
bars.”371 Although most people support cracking down on crime,
Zenger trial).
367
Assemb. 4469, 226th Leg. Sess. (NY 2003) (providing for a verdict of
only three-fourths in criminal cases and five-sixths in civil cases).
368
Nor for that matter does requiring a lower majority for felony cases than
misdemeanor cases considering the potential threat to the defendant’s liberty is
greater in felony cases.
369
See People v. Cancemi, 18 N.Y. 128, 135-36 (1858) (discussing the
fundamental difference between civil cases and criminal cases).
370
See supra note 5 (noting that only Oregon and Louisiana allow for
majority verdicts in felony cases).
371
MEMORANDUM, supra note 2. This argument is quite similar to the one
presented by the New York Crime Commission in 1931. In its report to the New
York Legislature, the Commission argued:
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the provision advocates an improper means of achieving the
desired result. The amendment assumes that criminals are not
being convicted because juries are unable to reach unanimous
verdicts.372 However, studies show that these so called “hung”
juries account for no more than 5 percent of all jury verdicts.373
Furthermore, these numbers fail to distinguish between juries that
hang on conviction and those that hang on acquittal. Therefore,
there is no guarantee that majority verdicts will reduce the crime
rate because eliminating the unanimity requirement will also make
it easier to acquit criminals.
The sponsors of the amendment provision suggest that offering
expanded constitutional protections produces higher crime rates
and “disrespect for the law.”374 If politicians want to reduce crime

Unanimous jury verdicts originated with the jury system when juries
were empanelled from the defendants’ most intimate neighbors and
acquaintances. The necessity and wisdom of the unanimous verdict at
that time could not be questioned. In these days jurymen are selected
more often because of their lack of acquaintanship [sic] with any of the
parties to the action or the attorneys. Under such circumstances it
would seem that the application of majority rule would be proper. If
there were provision for less than unanimous verdicts it would reduce
the number of “hung” juries and retrials and mistrials, especially in
criminal cases. It would place beyond control of a single individual
who might be actuated by improper motives of determining in a
capricious manner the guilt or innocence of the person charge with
crime. An amendment should be made empowering the Legislation, by
general law, to provide that verdicts in cases tried by juries may be
rendered by five-sixths of the jurors constituting the jury in any civil or
criminal action except where the crime charges is or may be punishable
by death.
N.Y. Leg. Documents no. 114 at p. 30-31 (1931).
372
See Hannaford & Munsterman, supra note 6, at 8 (noting that other
factors may prevent juries from reaching a verdict); Riley, supra note 347, at
A11 (pointing out that a reason the jury hangs is because the facts do not
warrant a conviction).
373
See HANNAFORD, ET AL., supra note 4, at 6 (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR.
& HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 461 (1966)). Although these results are
subject to debate as the methodology used in the study may have been flawed.
Id.
374
MEMORANDUM, supra note 2.
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and increase respect for the law, there are other, more suitable,
ways of achieving this goal. For example, the legislature could
invest more resources in crime prevention and deterrence.
Regardless, even if the proponents’ supposition were correct,
eliminating the unanimity requirement represents the wrong way to
go about addressing these issues. Adopting the amendment and
making it easier for juries to convict defendants will surely come at
the high cost of putting innocent people in jail. Furthermore, higher
crime rates and “disrespect for the law” have nothing to do with
the substantive power of the jury. It is not the jury’s responsibility
or duty to further law enforcement goals. Rather, the jury serves as
a finder of fact and a defender of liberty.375 In this regard, the jury
acts as an arbiter between the government and the defense.376
4. Alternatives to Eliminating the Unanimity Requirement
Amending the New York Constitution to eliminate the
unanimity requirement is an ineffective means of addressing the
perceived failings of the jury system. The jury is an institution that
belongs to the people; thus, instead of altering the right to a jury
trial, courts and the New York State legislature should do more to
protect it. In fact, considering what the right to a jury means to our
society, politicians and the public should work to strengthen the
right rather than diminish it. For this reason, jury reform initiatives,
such as the one initiated by Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye of New
York’s Court of Appeals, represent a more appropriate response to
the perceived problems with the jury system.377 These reform
movements primarily focus on improving the efficiency of the jury
system and on making it easier for citizens to serve on juries.378
375

See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980) (stating that the
defendant “has a substantial and legitimate expectation that he will be deprived
of his liberty only to the extent determined by the jury . . . and that liberty
interest is one that the Fourteenth Amendment preserves against arbitrary
deprivation by the State”).
376
See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 399 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
377
See Press Release, supra note 8.
378
Id. The Commission’s initial proposals focus on ways in which the state
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Thus, instead of reducing the jury’s substantive powers, these
initiatives focus on “increasing the level of juror satisfaction” and
look at ways in which courts and state legislatures can improve the
jury process.379
If the supporters of the proposed amendment are intent on
eliminating the unanimity requirement, they might also consider
requiring verdicts from 11-1 votes. This could help to reduce the
number of hung juries because it would prevent one person from
holding up a jury verdict.380 It also would minimize the dilution of
can “help reduce juror downtime and enhance the experience of service.” Id.
The Commission would like the court system to institute the following:
- Increase the length of time between successive calls to jury service,
including additional time off for person who serve on longer trials
- Implement a stand-by call-in system for jurors who agree to be
available within 2 hours to be contacted via beeper or cell phone
- Sanction lawyers who have multiple unexcused latenesses to help
ensure that cases are heard on schedule
- Require that mandatory settlement conferences takes place before
parties are permitted to pick a jury, in order to prevent jurors from
being used as bargaining tools in negotiations
- Develop new guidelines to help jury commissioners and judges better
estimate the number of jurors to call
....
- Offer free Internet access for jurors in every facility where possible,
for use during waiting periods
- Work to provide parking and public transportation passes for jurors
Id. See also Mark Curriden, Jury Reform. No One Agrees on Whether The
System is Broken, But Everyone is Trying to Change It, 81 A.B.A. J. 72, 75
(1995) (discussing reforms adopted by Arizona that provide jurors with
“notebooks that include the indictment, jury instructions, witness list,
photographs of all witnesses, and a section for note taking.”); Dean Narciso,
Jurors’ Service Painful, Empowering; Some Court Officials are Trying to Make
Civic Duty Palatable, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 12, 2003, at A1,
available at 2003 WL 63161040 (detailing the fact that an Ohio court offers
jurors amenities such as a pool table, internet access, pizza and flavored coffee).
379
The Commission on the Jury, Interim Report of the Commission on the
Jury to the Chief Judge of the State of New York 1-2 (2004) available at
http://www.jurycommission.com/pr2004_11.pdf.
380
HANNAFORD ET AL., supra note 4, at 11 (pointing out that 42 percent of
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voting, as eleven jurors’ votes ultimately will determine the
outcome. Furthermore, requiring eleven votes for a conviction
would serve to better safeguard the defendant’s liberty than would
requiring only majority verdicts.
Another option for states considering the elimination of the
unanimity requirement is to increase the size of the jury at the
same time they effect this change.381 This would allow more
citizens to serve on juries, thus providing them with valuable
exposure to and experience with the principles and virtues of selfgovernment.382 Moreover, a three-fourths majority verdict from a
twenty-four-person jury might be more palatable in terms of the
fair cross-section requirement because larger juries would give
people of color a better chance to serve.383 Having larger juries
would also increase the quality of deliberations because it would
allow for a greater exchange of ideas. As these alternatives
suggest, amending the state constitution is not the only way to
institute jury reforms. Indeed, efforts that focus on procedural
rather than substantive changes to the jury system may prove more
effective at addressing the jury system’s problems than the
elimination of the unanimity requirement.
CONCLUSION
The right to a jury trial represents a fundamental right in our
society. It forms one of the foundations of our political system and
aids in the protection of individual liberties.384 Serving on a jury
and taking part in the deliberation and voting process teaches
hung juries were the result of one or two holdouts).
381
See Amar, supra note 12, at 1188-89 (suggesting that those interested in
jury reform “should consider increasing the size of juries”).
382
Id. (stating that the size of the jury should actually be increased because
“jury service is a positive good” and having bigger juries will allow for more
people to serve).
383
Id. (“And so the deep inclusionary and cross-sectional spirit of later
amendments . . . confirms our founding vision of safety in large numbers.”).
384
See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 156 (1968) (stating
the right to a jury trial in criminal cases is “fundamental to the American scheme
of justice” and protects the defendant “against arbitrary law enforcement.”).
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jurors the moral values of civic republicanism.385 For this reason,
Tocqueville believed that “[t]he jury cannot fail to exercise a
powerful influence upon the national character.”386 Jury service
also provides citizens exposure to the principles and virtues of selfgovernance and offers them an opportunity to learn about the laws
of their locality.387
Although the jury no longer serves the same dual role in
society that it did at the time of the country’s founding, serving on
a jury remains a cherished American right. Instead of eliminating
the right to a jury or dramatically altering the right protected in the
New York Constitution, critics of the jury system should focus on
improving the existing jury system. Judge Judith Kaye’s formation
of a commission to study the jury in New York is a step in the right
direction.388 Before the New York State legislature engages in a
rash move to change the constitution, it should review the
commission’s findings and consider other, less drastic jury reform
efforts taking place around the country.389

385

AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 32, at 97. Amar believes “[t]he
jury summed up – indeed embodied – the ideals of populism, federalism, and
civic virtue that were the essence of the original Bill of Rights.” Id. (emphasis
added).
386
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 35, at 127.
387
Id. at 127 (describing the jury as “a gratuitous public school” where
jurors learn about their rights and become “practically acquainted with the
laws”).
388
See supra note 8.
389
See, e.g., Amar, supra note 12, at 1185-86 (arguing that more of an
effort should be made to raise the awareness of citizens and teach them about the
historical origins of the jury); Collins, supra note 271, at 499 (shorter
instructions and simpler language will make it easier for jurors to comprehend
the nature of the proceedings); Curriden, supra note 378, at 75; Kelso, supra
note 7, at 1442-45, 1488-1501 (reviewing various suggestions for reforming the
California jury); Arizona Governor Sings ‘Jury Patriotism Act, supra note 8
(discussing Arizona’s “Jury Patriotism Act”, which is intended to make “it
easier for citizens to serve as jurors”); Narciso, supra note 378; VERA INSTITUTE
OF JUSTICE, FIVE YEARS OF JURY REFORM: WHAT JURORS ARE SAYING
(Executive Summary), available at http://www.vera.org/publications (revealing
that the “pretrial period of summonsing and orientation is inefficient and
wasteful of juror time”).

